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arXiv 2107.02835q-bio.PEcs.SYeess.SYmath.DSmath.OC
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演化动力学与策略依赖翻修率的成对比较:稳定性和Delta被动性(扩展版)

Pairwise Comparison Evolutionary Dynamics with Strategy-Dependent Revision Rates: Stability and Delta-Passivity (Expanded Version)

Semih Kara, Nuno C. Martins

摘要:

我们报告的人口游戏的背景下,新的稳定性条件的演化动力学。我们坚持流行的框架,包括许多代理人,分组为人口,互动非合作,通过选择一个有利的回报策略。每一个代理都被允许以一个称为修改率的速率来反复修改它的策略。以前的稳定性结果认为,要么是一个无记忆的潜在游戏的回报机制,或允许动态(在回报机制)的代价是排除任何明确的依赖代理的修订率对他们目前的战略。允许修改率对策略的依赖是相关的,因为代理人在任何时间点的策略通常是不相等的。为了允许策略依赖的修订率和回报机制是动态的(或无记忆的游戏,是不是潜在的),我们专注于一个演化动力学类从一个简单的修改,从所谓的公正的成对比较策略修订协议。与修改后的类一致的修改协议保留了原始协议的优点,即代理人以完全分散的方式操作,并且具有最小的信息要求-他们只需要访问可用策略的支付值(而不是机制)。我们的主要结果确定的条件下,系统理论的无源性属性得到保证,我们利用稳定性分析。

英文摘要:

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting strategies with a favorable payoff. Each agent is repeatedly allowed to revise its strategy at a rate referred to as revision rate. Previous stability results considered either that the payoff mechanism was a memoryless potential game, or allowed for dynamics (in the payoff mechanism) at the expense of precluding any explicit dependence of the agents' revision rates on their current strategies. Allowing the dependence of revision rates on strategies is relevant because the agents' strategies at any point in time are generally unequal. To allow for strategy-dependent revision rates and payoff mechanisms that are dynamic (or memoryless games that are not potential), we focus on an evolutionary dynamics class obtained from a straightforward modification of one that stems from the so-called impartial pairwise comparison strategy revision protocol. Revision protocols consistent with the modified class retain from those in the original one the advantage that the agents operate in a fully decentralized manner and with minimal information requirements - they need to access only the payoff values (not the mechanism) of the available strategies. Our main results determine conditions under which system-theoretic passivity properties are assured, which we leverage for stability analysis.

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