结构化人群中敲诈勒索的演变
Evolution of extortion in structured populations
摘要：
在重复囚徒困境博弈中，勒索策略可以支配任何对手。但是，如果参与者能够采用表现更好的策略，勒索就会变得普遍，进化也会变得不稳定。它有时可能是合作进化的催化剂，也可能出现在两个种群之间的相互作用中，但它不是进化稳定的结果。在这里，我们重新审视这些结果在空间游戏领域。我们发现，成对模仿和出生-死亡动态返回已知的进化结果。另一方面，短视的最佳对策策略更新揭示了新的违反直觉的解决方案。背叛者和勒索者会自发地变粗，这使得合作者即使在高得令人望而却步的背叛诱惑下也能占上风。在这里，勒索策略扮演了特洛伊木马的角色。他们可能会在叛逃者中偶然出现，一旦他们出现，合作者也会变得可行。这些结果是独立的相互作用的拓扑结构，他们强调的重要性，粗化，棋盘排序，并在进化游戏中的最佳对策更新。
英文摘要：
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between two populations, yet it is not the evolutionary stable outcome. Here we revisit these results in the realm of spatial games. We find that pairwise imitation and birth-death dynamics return known evolutionary outcomes. Myopic best response strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals new counterintuitive solutions. Defectors and extortioners coarsen spontaneously, which allows cooperators to prevail even at prohibitively high temptations to defect. Here extortion strategies play the role of a Trojan horse. They may emerge among defectors by chance, and once they do, cooperators become viable as well. These results are independent of the interaction topology, and they highlight the importance of coarsening, checkerboard ordering, and best response updating in evolutionary games.
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