We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of a public goods game in social systems with higher-order interactions. First, we show that the game on uniform hypergraphs corresponds to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit, providing a formal theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups. Secondly, we unveil how the presence of hubs and the coexistence of interactions in groups of different sizes affects the evolution of cooperation. Finally, we apply the proposed framework to extract the actual dependence of the synergy factor on the size of a group from real-world collaboration data in science and technology. Our work provides a way to implement informed actions to boost cooperation in social groups.
Understanding of evolutionary mechanism of online social networks is greatly significant for the development of network science. However, present researches on evolutionary mechanism of online social networks are neither deep nor clear enough. In this study, we empirically showed the essential evolution characteristics of Renren online social network. From the perspective of Pareto wealth distribution and bidirectional preferential attachment, the origin of online social network evolution is analyzed and the evolution mechanism of online social networks is explained. Then a novel model is prop…
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behavior in humans and social animals also compel to conformity on their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective su…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is uniqu…
Complex networks often exhibit co-evolutionary dynamics, meaning that the network topology and the state of nodes or links are coupled, affecting each other in overlapping time scales. We focus on the co-evolutionary dynamics of online social networks, and on Twitter in particular. Monitoring the activity of thousands of Twitter users in real-time, and tracking their followers and tweets/retweets, we propose a method to infer new retweet-driven follower relations. The formation of such relations is much more likely than the exogenous creation of new followers in the absence of any retweets. We…
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who…
Human beings tend to cooperate with close friends, therefore they have to construct strong social relationships to recieve cooperation from others. Therefore they should have acquired their strategies of social relationship construction through an evolutionary process. The behavior of social relationship construction is know as "social grooming." In this paper, we show that there are four classes including a human-like strategy in evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies based on an evolutionary game simulation. Social relationship strengths (as measured by frequency of social groom…
Preventing infectious disease like flu from spreading to large communities is one of the most important issues for humans. One effective strategy is voluntary vaccination, however, there is always the temptation for people refusing to be vaccinated because once herd immunity is achieved, infection risk is greatly reduced. In this paper, we study the effect of social impact on the vaccination behavior resulting in preventing infectious disease in networks. The evolutionary simulation results show that the social impact has both positive and negative effects on the vaccination behavior. Especial…
Cooperation among unrelated individuals is frequently observed in social groups when their members combine efforts and resources to obtain a shared benefit that is unachievable by an individual alone. However, understanding why cooperation arises despite the natural tendency of individuals towards selfish behavior is still an open problem and represents one of the most fascinating challenges in evolutionary dynamics. Recently, the structural characterization of the networks in which social interactions take place has shed some light on the mechanisms by which cooperative behavior emerges and e…
In this paper, we inspect well-known population genetics and social dynamics models. In these models, interacting individuals, while participating in a self-organizing process, give rise to the emergence of complex behaviors and patterns. While one main focus in population genetics is on the adaptive behavior of a population, social dynamics is more often concerned with the splitting of a connected array of individuals into a state of global polarization, that is, the emergence of speciation. Applying computational and mathematical tools we show that the way the mechanisms of selection, intera…
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.
Current social networks are of extremely large-scale generating tremendous information flows at every moment. How information diffuse over social networks has attracted much attention from both industry and academics. Most of the existing works on information diffusion analysis are based on machine learning methods focusing on social network structure analysis and empirical data mining. However, the dynamics of information diffusion, which are heavily influenced by network users' decisions, actions and their socio-economic interactions, is generally ignored by most of existing works. In this p…
In Evolutionary Dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called "Lattice Reciprocity" mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the Prisoner's Dilemma game when the population of darwinian replicators interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact results on a "Dipole Model" are presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive numerical Monte Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework u…
We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference of individual decision makers and the consensual choice of a group, that have been empirically observed in choice dilemmas. In particular, a deviation from the Nash equilibrium towards the risky strategy occurs when the dynamics takes place on heterogeneous hypergraphs. These results can explain the emergence of irrational herding and radical behav…
Based on suitable video recordings of interactive pedestrian motion and improved tracking software, we apply an evolutionary optimization algorithm to determine optimal parameter specifications for the social force model. The calibrated model is then used for large-scale pedestrian simulations of evacuation scenarios, pilgrimage, and urban environments.
Social networks have become ubiquitous in our daily life, as such it has attracted great research interests recently. A key challenge is that it is of extremely large-scale with tremendous information flow, creating the phenomenon of "Big Data". Under such a circumstance, understanding information diffusion over social networks has become an important research issue. Most of the existing works on information diffusion analysis are based on either network structure modeling or empirical approach with dataset mining. However, the information diffusion is also heavily influenced by network users'…
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account th…
Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the tran…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic…
Competitive information diffusion on large-scale social networks reveals fundamental characteristics of rumor contagions and has profound influence on public opinion formation. There has been growing interest in exploring dynamical mechanisms of the competing evolutions recently. Nevertheless, the impacts of population homophily, which determines powerful collective human behaviors, remains unclear. In this paper, we incorporate homophily effects into a modified competitive ignorant-spreader-ignorant (SIS) rumor diffusion model with generalized population preference. Using microscopic Markov c…
Collective, especially group-based, managerial decision making is crucial in organizations. Using an evolutionary theoretic approach to collective decision making, agent-based simulations were conducted to investigate how human collective decision making would be affected by the agents' diversity in problem understanding and/or behavior in discussion, as well as by their social network structure. Simulation results indicated that groups with consistent problem understanding tended to produce higher utility values of ideas and displayed better decision convergence, but only if there was no grou…
When evolutionary games are contested in structured populations, the degree of each player in the network plays an important role. If they exist, hubs often determine the fate of the population in remarkable ways. Recent research based on optimal percolation in random networks has shown, however, that the degree is neither the sole nor the best predictor of influence in complex networks. Low-degree nodes may also be optimal influencers if they are hierarchically linked to hubs. Taking this into account leads to the formalism of collective influence in complex networks, which as we show here, h…
On one hand, kinship is a universal human phenomenon that tends to align with biological relatedness, which might suggest evolutionary foundations. On the other hand, kinship has exceptional variation across the human populations, which points to cultural foundations. Furthermore, even if its foundation was biological, kinship is often too imprecise to track genetic relatedness efficiently, while inclusive fitness theory would suggest focusing only on the closest relatives, which is not the case in most human cultures. It was the parallel validity of these contradicting arguments that led to d…
Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce social dilemmas with informed strategies, and we show that this gives rise to two cyclically dominant triplets that form defensive alliances. The stability of these two alliances is determined by the rotation velocity of the strategies within each triplet. A weaker strategy in a faster rotating triplet can thus overcome an individually stronger competitor. Fas…
Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interactions. Players engage in public goods games and are allowed to leave their groups if too many defections occur. Both social cohesion and task cohesion may prevent players from leaving. While a higher level of social cohesion increases a player's tolerance towards defections, task cohesion is associated with her group performance in the past. With a higher level of task cohesion, it is more likely that a dissatisf…
We study the interplay between evolutionary game and network structure and show how the dynamics of the game affect the growth pattern of the network and how the evolution of the network influence the cooperative behavior in the game. Simulation results show that the payoff-based preferential attachment mechanism leads to the emergence of a scale-free structural property, $P(k)\sim k^{-γ}$. Moreover, we investigate the average path length and the assortative mixing features. The obtained results indicate that the network has small-world and positive assortative behaviors, which are consistent …
Studies of collective human behavior in the social sciences, often grounded in details of actions by individuals, have much to offer `social' models from the physical sciences concerning elegant statistical regularities. Drawing on behavioral studies of social influence, we present a parsimonious, stochastic model, which generates an entire family of real-world right-skew socio-economic distributions, including exponential, winner-take-all, power law tails of varying exponents and power laws across the whole data. The widely used Albert-Barabasi model of preferential attachment is simply a spe…
Without contributing, defectors take more benefit from social resources than cooperators which is the reflection of a specific character of individuals. However, natural physical mechanisms of our society promote cooperation. Thus, in the long run, the evolution about genetic variation is something more than the social evolution about fitness. The loci of evolutionary paths of the cooperation and the defection are correlated, but not a full complement of each other. Yet, the only single specific mechanism which is operated by some rules explains the enhancement of cooperation where the indepen…
We present a stochastic model for a social network, where new actors may join the network, existing actors may become inactive and, at a later stage, reactivate themselves. Our model captures the evolution of the network, assuming that actors attain new relations or become active according to the preferential attachment rule. We derive the mean-field equations for this stochastic model and show that, asymptotically, the distribution of actors obeys a power-law distribution. In particular, the model applies to social networks such as wireless local area networks, where users connect to access-p…
Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the evolution of cooperation, we study a weak prisoner's dilemma where each player's participation is probabilistic rather than certain. Players that do not participate get a null payoff and are unable to replicate. We show that inactivity introduces cascading failures of cooperation, which are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs. …
We compare the likelihood of different socially relevant features to allow the evolutionary emergence and maintenance of cooperation in a generalized variant of the iterated Prisoners Dilemma game. Results show that the average costs/benefit balance of cooperation is the primary constraint for its establishment and maintenance. Behavior increasing inclusive fitness such as assortation, homophily, kin-selection and tagging of individuals, is second in importance. Networks characteristics were the least important in favoring the establishment and maintenance of cooperation, despite being the mos…
In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described as a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as their average neighbor. Here we investigate this model in the realm of evolutionary social dilemmas on the square lattice and scale-free networks. By using the master equation and Monte Carlo simulations, we find that cooperators coexist with defectors in the whole phase diagram, even at high temptations to defect. We study the microscopic mechanism that is responsible for …
Social inequalities are ubiquitous and here we show that the values of the Gini ($g$) and Kolkata ($k$) indices, two generic inequality indices, approach each other (starting from $g = 0$ and $k = 0.5$ for equality) as the competitions grow in various social institutions like markets, universities, elections, etc. It is further showed that these two indices become equal and stabilize at a value (at $g = k \simeq 0.87$) under unrestricted competitions. We propose to view this coincidence of inequality indices as a generalized version of the (more than a) century old 80-20 law of Pareto. Further…
Many real world, complex phenomena have underlying structures of evolving networks where nodes and links are added and removed over time. A central scientific challenge is the description and explanation of network dynamics, with a key test being the prediction of short and long term changes. For the problem of short-term link prediction, existing methods attempt to determine neighborhood metrics that correlate with the appearance of a link in the next observation period. Recent work has suggested that the incorporation of topological features and node attributes can improve link prediction. W…
Eco-evolutionary game dynamics which characterizes the mutual interactions and the coupled evolutions of strategies and environments has been of growing interests in very recent years. Since such feedback loops widely exist in a range of coevolutionary systems, such as microbial systems, social-ecological system and psychological-economic system, recent modeling frameworks that unveil the oscillating dynamics of social dilemmas have great potential for practical applications. In this perspective article, we overview the latest progress of evolutionary game theory in this direction. We describe…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.
Although a number of models have been developed to investigate the emergence of culture and evolutionary phases in social systems, one important aspect has not yet been sufficiently emphasized. This is the structure of the underlaying network of social relations serving as channels in transmitting cultural traits, which is expected to play a crucial role in the evolutionary processes in social systems. In this paper we contribute to the understanding of the role of the network structure by developing a layered ego-centric network structure based model, inspired by the social brain hypothesis, …
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity preservation. An important, and so far overlooked, aspect of reality is the diverse strategic identities of individuals. While applying the same strategy to all interaction partners may be an acceptable assumption for simpler forms of life, this fails to account} for the behavior of more complex living beings. For instance, we humans act differently around different peo…
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially effic…
The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in structured populations has been studied extensively in recent years. Whereas many theoretical studies have found that a heterogeneous network of contacts favors cooperation, the impact of spatial effects in scale-free networks is still not well understood. In addition to being heterogeneous, real contact networks exhibit a high mean local clustering coefficient, which implies the existence of an underlying metric space. Here, we show that evolutionary dynamics in scale-free networks self-organize into spatial patterns in the underlying metric …
The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studying the mean extinction times of cooperators and defecto…
Tiny perturbations may trigger large responses in systems near criticality, shifting them across equilibria. Committed minorities are suggested to be responsible for the emergence of collective behaviors in many physical, social, and biological systems. Using evolutionary game theory, we address the question whether a finite fraction of zealots can drive the system to large-scale coordination. We find that a tipping point exists in coordination games, whereas the same phenomenon depends on the selection pressure, update rule, and network structure in other types of games. Our study paves the w…
We focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperation and sustaining cooperators. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on a variant of Watts-Strogatz small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. Moreover, neither the most heterogeneous case nor …
The rise in online social networking has brought about a revolution in social relations. However, its effects on offline interactions and its implications for collective well-being are still not clear and are under-investigated. We study the ecology of online and offline interaction in an evolutionary game framework where individuals can adopt different strategies of socialization. Our main result is that the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with hostile social environments can lead the economy to non-socially optimal stationary states.
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This body of work has primarily focused on games in which players face a simple binary choice, to "cooperate" or "defect". Real individuals, however, often exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of so…
"Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions, as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents anti-coordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using different strategy updating protocols, we observ…
Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study evolutionary games on populations that are structured beyond pairwise interactions. Specifically, we introduce a general evolutionary approach that allows studying situations in which indirect interactions via a neighbor other than the direct pairwise connection (or via a group of neighbors), impact the strategy of the focal player. To this end, we consider simp…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the usual strategies in the present model the players are also characterized by one of the two extreme personal features representing the egoist or fraternal behavior. During the evolution each player can modify both her own strategy and/or personal feature via a myopic update process in order to improve her utility. The results of numerical simulations and stabili…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are at least as much as in scale-free networks but here the population model is more realistic. Cooperation is robust with respect to different strategy update rules, population dynamics, and payoff computation. Only when straight average payoff is used or there is high strategy or network noise does cooperation decrease in all games and disappear in the Prisoner…
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic. This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players' strategies, which we study both numerically and analytically.
We propose an extended spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) model to study the dynamics of individual career choice and the corresponding social output. Based on the social value orientation theory, we categorized two classes of work, namely the public work if it serves public interests, and the private work if it serves personal interests. Under the context of SEPGG, choosing public work is to cooperate and choosing private work is to defect. We then investigate the effects of employee productivity, human capital and external subsidies on individual career choices of the two work ty…
