The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a dynamical directed network. We show that the opinion invasion is captured by a replicator equation of an emergent four-player two-strategy game, and the average in(out)-degree for the two opinions is fully captured by an emergent three-player two-strategy game. Interestingly, it is shown that the difference between the two emergent games arises from the uni-directionality of the network. The difference implies that the opinion with a small number of disciples can take over the population for in-group bias, provided that the network is directed. Our work makes an explicit connection between opinion dynamics and evolutionary games.
Impact of network randomness on multiple opinion dynamics
人们经常面临在具有相似吸引力的不同选项中做出选择的挑战。为了研究在这种情况下出现的偏好分布,一个有用的方法是在复杂网络上模拟观点动力学,复杂网络由节点(个体)和它们的连接(边缘)组成,其中每个节点的状态可以是包括未决定状态在内的几种观点之一。我们使用两种不同的动力学规则:提出的Travieso-Fontoura(TF)和多元性规则(PR),这是流出和流入动力学的典范,分别。我们特别感兴趣的是网络随机性对最终意见分布的影响。为此目的,我们考虑Watts-Strogatz网络,它具有小世界属性,并且随机性由向初始规则网络添加随机捷径的概率$p$控制。根据$p$的值、平均连接性$\langle k \rangle$和初始条件,最终分布基本上可以是(i)一致,(ii)不同选项的共存,或(iii)犹豫不决的优势。我们发现,在这两种动态中,获胜意见的主导地位是通过增加重新连接(捷径)的数量,促进共识而获得的。与TF情况相反,在PR动态中,一小部分未决定的节点可以持续在最终状态。在这种情况下,由于决策组中的关系,在小世界区域内出现了最大数量的未决定节点。
Some political strategies to win elections over the last years were based heavily on fomenting general distrust in information institutions and favoring distrustful sources. The misinformation pandemic has the straightforward consequence that people do not believe any information unless it is compatible with their own beliefs. We present a simple model to study the emergence of consensus in opinion pools of uncertain agents that trust (couple to) their neighbors (information sources) with strength K. We focus the studies on regular lattices and linear coupling. Depending on the coupling consta…
Threshold models of cascades in the social sciences and economics explain the spread of opinion and innovation due to social influence. In threshold cascade models, fads or innovations spread between agents as determined by their interactions with other agents and their personal threshold of resistance. Typically, these models do not account for structure in the timing of interaction between the units. In this work, we extend a model of social cascades by Duncan Watts to temporal interaction networks. In our model, we assume friends and acquaintances influence agents for a certain time into th…