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arXiv 2307.05511physics.soc-ph
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动态有向网络中少数追随者的意见可以获胜:一个演化博弈视角

Opinions with few disciples can win in the dynamical directed networks: an evolutionary game perspective

Yakun Wang, Bin Wu

AI总结:

本文在动态有向网络上建立选民模型,将意见入侵与平均度动态分别映射为涌现的四玩家和三玩家演化博弈,揭示网络单向性使少数追随者意见在内群体偏好下也能获胜。

摘要:

网络上的选民模型对于理解意见形成至关重要。单向社会交互在真实社会网络中无处不在,而无向交互则被深入研究。我们在一个动态有向网络上建立了一个选民模型。我们表明,意见入侵由一个涌现的四玩家双策略博弈的复制方程所刻画,而两种意见的平均入(出)度则完全由一个涌现的三玩家双策略博弈所刻画。有趣的是,研究表明这两个涌现博弈之间的差异源于网络的单向性。该差异意味着,只要网络是有向的,在群体内偏好的作用下,拥有少量追随者的意见可以占领整个群体。我们的工作明确建立了意见动力学与演化博弈之间的联系。

英文摘要:

The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a dynamical directed network. We show that the opinion invasion is captured by a replicator equation of an emergent four-player two-strategy game, and the average in(out)-degree for the two opinions is fully captured by an emergent three-player two-strategy game. Interestingly, it is shown that the difference between the two emergent games arises from the uni-directionality of the network. The difference implies that the opinion with a small number of disciples can take over the population for in-group bias, provided that the network is directed. Our work makes an explicit connection between opinion dynamics and evolutionary games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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