arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 0910.4150physics.soc-phcond-mat.stat-mechq-bio.PE
收藏

正则图上三策略进化囚徒困境博弈的Phase diagrams

Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on regular graphs

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Gyorgy Szabo

摘要:

研究了局中人位于正方形格子和随机正则图上的进化囚徒困境博弈,每个局中人有四个邻居。参与者遵循三种策略之一:针锋相对、无条件合作和背叛。简化的支付矩阵由两个参数表征:$b$选择背叛的诱惑和$c$减少针锋相对收益的检查成本。在固定的噪声水平下,通过两两比较来控制来自其中一个邻居的策略模仿。使用蒙特卡罗模拟和扩展版本的对近似,我们已经评估了$b-c$相图表明丰富的相变之间的平稳共存,吸收和振荡状态,包括连续和不连续的相变。通过合理的成本,针锋相对的策略,防止灭绝的合作者在整个跨度的$b$值确定的囚徒困境游戏,无论互动图结构。我们还表明,该系统可以表现出一个重复的连续的振荡和稳定状态时,改变一个单一的回报值,这突出了显着的敏感性周期性相互作用的参数,定义优势的强度。

英文摘要:

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation, and defection. The simplified payoff matrix is characterized by two parameters: the temptation $b$ to choose defection, and the cost $c$ of inspection reducing the income of tit-for-tat. The strategy imitation from one of the neighbors is controlled by pairwise comparison at a fixed level of noise. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of pair approximation we have evaluated the $b-c$ phase diagrams indicating a rich plethora of phase transitions between stationary coexistence, absorbing and oscillatory states, including continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. By reasonable costs the tit-for-tat strategy prevents extinction of cooperators across the whole span of $b$ values determining the prisoner's dilemma game, irrespective of the interaction graph structure. We also demonstrate that the system can exhibit a repetitive succession of oscillatory and stationary states upon changing a single payoff value, which highlights the remarkable sensitivity of cyclical interactions on parameters that define the strength of dominance.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑