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arXiv 0905.1456physics.soc-ph
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群体进化囚徒困境博弈

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game in Flocks

Zhuo Chen, Jian-Xi Gao, Yun-Ze Cai, Xiao-Ming Xu

摘要:

我们研究了一个进化的囚徒困境游戏之间的自我驱动的代理,生物群体的集体运动是通过平均邻居的方向来模仿。根据诱惑的缺陷和代理移动的速度,我们发现,合作不仅可以保持在这样的系统中,但存在一个最佳的相互作用的邻域大小,它可以诱导最大的合作水平。与所有智能体都不移动的情况相比,在速度和邻域大小不太大的情况下,个体的移动甚至可以增强合作。此外,我们还发现系统具有聚集行为,并且在平衡点处合作者和背叛者可以共存。

英文摘要:

We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move, we find that cooperation can not only be maintained in such a system but there exists an optimal size of interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move, cooperation can even be enhanced by the mobility of individuals, provided that the velocity and the size of neighborhood are not too large. Besides, we find that the system exhibits aggregation behavior, and cooperators may coexist with defectors at equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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