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arXiv physics/0504174physics.soc-ph
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具有动态偏好选择的进化囚徒困境博弈

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with dynamic preferential selection

Zhi-Xi Wu, Xin-Jian Xu, Zi-Gang Huang, Sheng-Jun Wang, Ying-Hai Wang

摘要:

我们研究了一个发生在二维无序正方形格子上的改进的囚徒困境博弈。玩家是纯粹的战略家,可以与他们的近邻合作或叛逃。在每一代中,每个参与者都通过遵循相邻策略之一来更新其策略,其概率取决于收益差异。邻居选择遵循动态优先规则,即,在前几轮中,焦点参与者越频繁地采用邻居的策略,它在随后的几轮中被选择参考的概率就越大。结果表明,这种简单的选择机制大大促进了合作。通过对参与者影响权重分布、持续性和关联函数的研究,给出了相应的分析。

英文摘要:

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player update its strategy by following one of the neighboring strategies with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. The neighbor selection obeys a dynamic preferential rule, i.e., the more frequently a neighbor's strategy was adopted by the focal player in the previous rounds, the larger probability it will be chosen to refer to in the subsequent rounds. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted due to this simple selection mechanism. Corresponding analysis is provided by the investigations of the distribution of players' impact weights, persistence, and as well as correlation function.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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