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arXiv physics/0504190physics.soc-ph
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完全理性下动态网络的囚徒困境

Prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks under perfect rationality

Christoly Biely, Klaus Dragosits, Stefan Thurner

摘要:

我们认为囚犯的困境被反复播放的动态网络,代理人可以选择他们的行动以及他们的合作伙伴。这导致了网络结构和玩家策略模式的共同进化。个人的决定是完全理性的,只基于当地的信息。它们的目的是解决与叛逃特工的联系,并使合作特工建立新的联系。更新方案的确切形式是由利润最大化而不是模仿所驱动的。如果参与者以同步的方式更新他们的决策,系统就会表现出振荡动力学:合作(和整体联系)增长的时期与背叛增长的时期交替出现。当参与者不太同步时,循环行为减少,系统稳定在显著的总合作水平。在这一制度中,我们发现紧急网络结构类似于“复杂”和层次拓扑结构。幂律度分布($γ\sim8.6$)的指数与人类通信网络的经验结果完全吻合。

英文摘要:

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players. Individual decisions are made fully rationally and are based on local information only. They are made such that links to defecting agents are resolved and that cooperating agents build up new links. The exact form of the updating scheme is motivated by profit maximization and not by imitation. If players update their decisions in a synchronized way the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics: Periods of growing cooperation (and total linkage) alternate with periods of increasing defection. The cyclical behavior is reduced and the system stabilizes at significant total cooperation levels when players are less synchronized. In this regime we find emergent network structures resembling 'complex' and hierarchical topology. The exponent of the power-law degree distribution ($γ\sim8.6$) perfectly matches empirical results of human communication networks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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