We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.
We introduce the stochastic Network-Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD) model, a network of players playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with their neighbours, each with a memory-one strategy which they constantly and locally update to improve their success. This process is non-deterministic, and mirrors societal interactions in many relevant aspects. We use it to assess the flexibility, noise tolerance and real-world adaptability of some well-known strategies. Furthermore, in the model a new strategy naturally emerges which proves way more successful than those. We also derive some theoretical param…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been increasingly explored by many researchers. On the basis of active linking dynamics [J. M. Pacheco et al., J. Theor. Biol. 243, 437 (2006), J. M. Pacheco et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006)], we show that cooperation is enhanced fairly robustly. In particular, cooperation evolves when the payoff of the player is normalized by the number of neighbors; this is…
This manuscript explores the research topics and collaborative behaviour of authors in the field of the Prisoner's Dilemma using topic modeling and a graph theoretic analysis of the co-authorship network. The analysis identified five research topics in the Prisoner's Dilemma which have been relevant over the course of time. These are human subject research, biological studies, strategies, evolutionary dynamics on networks and modeling problems as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Moreover, the results demonstrated the Prisoner's Dilemma is a field of continued interest, and that it is a collaborative…
We studied synchronization between prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation in two Newman-Watts small-world networks. It was found that there are three kinds of synchronization: partial phase synchronization, total phase synchronization and complete synchronization, for varied coupling factors. Besides, two games can reach complete synchronization for the large enough coupling factor. We also discussed the effect of coupling factor on the amplitude of oscillation of $cooperator$ density.
Game theory is fundamental to understanding cooperation between agents. Mainly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known model that has been extensively studied in complex networks. However, although the emergence of cooperation has been investigated before, the influence of memory in its evolution is not well understood. This paper presents a detailed study of cooperation dynamics in which agents have memory. We simulate the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on random, scale-free and networks presenting degree-degree correlation. Through extensive simulations, we show that assortativity can …
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversi…
In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) where palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits in the PD. When a new node is attached, the node make linkes to nodes in the network with the probabilities in proportion to the profits made by the game. Iterating this process, a network grows. We investigate properties of this type of growing networks, especially the degree distribution and time-depending strategy distribution by running computer simulation. We also find a sort of phase transition in the strategy dist…
Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas it still lacks specific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game as well. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of recorded punishment, involved with memory and punishment, into spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We find that increasing punishment rate or memory length promotes the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Interestingly, compared with traditional version, recorded punishment will facilitate cooperation better…
We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model. It is found that the frequency of cooperators decreases with the increment of the average degree $\bar{k}$ from the simulation results. And reducing inter-community links can promote cooperation when we keep the total links (including inner-community and inter-community links) unchanged. It is also shown that the heterogeneity of networks does not always enhance cooperation and the pattern of links among all the vertices under a given degree-…
We show that the success of cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a complex network can be predicted by a simple, quantitative network analysis using mean field parameters. The criterion is shown to be accurate on a wide variety of networks with degree distributions ranging from regular to Poisson to scale-free. The network analysis uses a parameter that allows for comparisons of networks with both similar, and distinct, topologies. Furthermore, we establish the criterion here as a natural network analogue of Hamilton's classical rule for kin selection, despite arising in an ent…
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest neighbor interactions. The applied host geometry makes possible to study the impacts of two conflicting topological features. The evolutionary rule involves some noise affecting the strategy adoptions between the interacting players. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of dynamical mean-field theory we determined the phase diagram as a function of noise leve…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move, we find that cooperation can not only be maintained in such a system but there exists an optimal size of interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move, cooperation can even be enhanced by the mobility of individuals, provided that the velocity and the size o…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy adoption (learning) mechanism. This system is investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation method. We consider the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for a fixed interaction graph, while varying the number of edges in the learning graph. According to the Monte Carlo simulations, the cooperation is modified…
We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoner's Dilemma players are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane. Our results show that cooperation can survive in such a system provided that both the temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move are not too high. Moreover, we show that when these conditions are fulfilled, the only asymptotic state of the system is that in which all players are cooperators. Our results might have implications for the design of coo…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutiona…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player update its strategy by following one of the neighboring strategies with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. The neighbor selection obeys a dynamic preferential rule, i.e., the more frequently a neighbor's strategy was adopted by the focal player in the previous rounds, the larger probability it will be chosen to refer to in the subsequent rounds. It…
Prisoner's Dilemma is a game theory model used to describe altruistic behavior seen in various populations. This theoretical game is important in understanding why a seemingly selfish strategy does persist and spread throughout a population that is mixing homogeneously at random. For a population with structure determined by social interactions, Prisoner's Dilemma brings to light certain requirements for the altruistic strategy to become established. Monte Carlo simulations of Prisoner's Dilemma are carried out using both simulated social networks and a dataset of a real social network. In bot…
We investigate the win-lose relations between strategies of iterated prisoner's dilemma games by using a directed network concept to display the replicator dynamics results. In the giant strongly-connected component of the win/lose network, we find win-lose circulations similar to rock-paper-scissors and analyze the fixed point and its stability. Applying the network motif concept, we introduce dynamic motifs, which describe the population dynamics relations among the three strategies. Through exact enumeration, we find 22 dynamic motifs and display their phase portraits. Visualization using d…
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is a well studied framework for understanding direct reciprocity and cooperation in pairwise encounters. However, measuring the morality of various IPD strategies is still largely lacking. Here, we partially address this issue by proposing a suit of plausible morality metrics to quantify four aspects of justice. We focus our closed-form calculation on the class of reactive strategies because of their mathematical tractability and expressive power. We define reactive means as a tool for studying how actors in the IPD and Iterated Snowdrift Game (ISG) behave…
The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading, the evolution of cooperation is inhibited on the structured scale-free network while performing the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Firstly, we demonstrate that neither the scale-free property nor the high clustering coefficient is responsible for the inhibition of cooperation spreading on the structured scale-free …
Evolutionary Dynamics of Reputation-Based Voluntary Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Kyushu University（九州大学）；Teesside University（蒂斯赛德大学）；CSSC Systems Engineering Research Institute（中国船舶系统工程研究院）；CSSC Intelligent Innovation Research Institute（中国船舶智能创新研究院）；Yunnan University of Finance and Economics（云南财经大学）；University of Maribor（马里博尔大学）；Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor（马里博尔阿道夫·德罗尔克博士社区健康中心）；Kyung Hee University（庆熙大学）；Korea University（高丽大学）；Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学）
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on scale-free networks for different initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors: initially random distribution with different frequencies of defectors; intentional organization with defectors initially occupying the most connected nodes with different fractions of defectors; intentional assignment for cooperators occupying the most connected nodes with different proportions of defectors at the beginning. It is shown that initial configurations for cooperators and defectors can influence…
Understanding the role of network structure in the evolution of cooperation is a key research goal at the intersection between physics and biology. Recent studies have particularly focused on multiplex networks given that multiple social domains are interrelated and cannot be represented by single-layer networks. However, the role of network multiplexity is not fully understood when combined with another important network characteristic: network dynamics. In the present study, we investigated evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games played on dynamic two-layer multiplex networks in which the payo…
We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players. Individual decisions are made fully rationally and are based on local information only. They are made such that links to defecting agents are resolved and that cooperating agents build up new links. The exact form of the updating scheme is motivated by profit maximization and not by imitation. If players update their decisions in a synchronized way the system exhi…
We investigate the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where both players alternately use reinforcement learning to obtain their optimal memory-one strategies. We theoretically solve the simultaneous Bellman optimality equations of reinforcement learning. We find that the Win-stay Lose-shift strategy, the Grim strategy, and the strategy which always defects can form symmetric equilibrium of the mutual reinforcement learning process amongst all deterministic memory-one strategies.
Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or between living beings in biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) describes situations in which it is profitable if everybody cooperates rather than defects (free-rides or cheats), but as cooperation is risky and defection is tempting, the expected outcome is defection. Nevertheless, some biological and social mechanisms can support cooperation by effectively transforming the payoffs. Here, we study the related phase transitions, which can be of first order (d…
In this paper we study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in random scale-free networks. We show that the survival of cooperation is enhanced with respect to random homogeneous graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when compared to that found in Barabási-Albert scale-free networks. We show that the latter decrease is related with the structure of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean field approximation for studying evolutionary dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and with arbitrary degree distribution. The mean field approach i…
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of defectors, we continue to lack the condition for the formation of a giant cooperator cluster that assures the prevalence of cooperation in a system. Here, we study the dynamical organization of cooperator clusters in spatial prisoner's dilemma game to offer the condition for the dominance of cooperation, finding that a phase transition characterized b…
Promoting cooperation is an intellectual challenge in the social sciences, for which the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) is a fundamental framework. The traditional view that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can unilaterally control the share of the surplus has been challenged by a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies raised by Press and Dyson. In particular, the extortionate strategies can subdue the opponent and obtain higher scores. However, no empirical evidence has yet been found to support this theoretical finding. In a long-run laboratory experim…
The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored question in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals' decisions are taken in a pure strategic basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the replication of the most successful neighbor's strategy (unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter dynamics are a…
In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of people's individuality. In order to investigate how diversity of agent's rationality affects the evolution of cooperation, we introduce the individual rationality proportional to the $β$th power of the each agent's degree. Simulation results on heterogeneous scale-free network show that the dynamic process is greatly affected by the diversity of rationality. Both promotion and inhibition of cooperative behavior can be observed at different region of parameter $β$. We present explanation to these results by quantitati…
We present results of the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks that have population change. We introduce a death process with minimum requirements and show that it induces a highly cooperative society. We also study the effects of immigration on the society. We show that the acceptable number of immigrants of the society is determined by the population of the society, the ratio of cooperator among immigrants, and the immigration interval. In addition, if immigrants have a preferential attachment link, the acceptable number of immigrants increases.
We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for memory-two deterministic strategies to form symmetric equilibria. We then provide three examples of memory-two deterministic strategies which form symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibria. We also prove that mutual reinforcement learning equilibria formed by memory-two strategies are also mutual reinforcement learning equilibria when both players use…
Two-player games have had a long and fruitful history of applications stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. Most applications of two-player games assume synchronous decisions or moves even when the games are iterated. But different strategies may emerge as preferred when the decisions or moves are sequential, or the games are iterated. Zero-determinant strategies developed by Press and Dyson are a new class of strategies that have been developed for synchronous two-player games, most notably the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Here we apply the Press-Dyson analysis to s…
We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}…
We study the prisoner's dilemma model with a noisy imitation evolutionary dynamics on directed out-homogeneous and uncorrelated directed random networks. An heterogeneous pair mean-field approximation is presented showing good agreement with Monte Carlo simulations in the limit of weak selection (high noise) where we obtain analytical predictions for the critical temptations. We discuss the phase diagram as a function of temptation, intensity of noise and coordination number of the networks and we consider both the model with and without self-interaction. We compare our results with available …
We use replicator dynamics to study an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with memory. In this study, we investigate the characteristics of all 32 possible strategies with a single-step memory by observing the results when each strategy encounters another one. Based on these results, we define similarity measures between the 32 strategies and perform a network analysis of the relationship between the strategies by constructing a strategies network. Interestingly, we find that a win-lose circulation, like rock-paper-scissors, exists between strategies and that the circulation results from one unu…
The lowest temptation level (T = 1) is considered a trivial case for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, we show that this statement is true only for a very particular case, where the players interact with only one player. Otherwise, if the players interact with more than one player, the system presents the same possible behaviors observed for $T > 1$. In the steady state, the system can reach the cooperative, chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy and the cooperative or quasi-regular phases, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy.
On the existence of fair zero-determinant strategies in the periodic prisoner's dilemma game
Graduate School of Sciences and Technology for Innovation, Yamaguchi University（山口大学创新科学技术研究生院）；Department of Physics, Tokyo Metropolitan University（东京都立大学物理系）
We have studied the effect of memory on evolution of the prisoner's dilemma game using square lattice networks. Based on extensive simulations, we found that the density of cooperators was enhanced by an increasing memory effect for most parameters. However, we also observed that the density of cooperators decreased with an increased memory effect in the case of a large memory and moderate temptation. It is interesting to note that memory makes cooperators immune from temptation. The strength of protection reaches its maximal value only for the moderate memory effect.
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, as it constitutes an emblematic example of a game whose Nash equilibrium is defection. Previous investigations showed that, under opportune conditions, it is possible to reach, in the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma, an equilibrium of cooperation. Notably, it seems that mechanisms like motion may lead a population to become cooperative. In the propos…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The agents' decisions are directly linked to their level of optimism since they decide to play if they believe the opponent has a high probability of cooperating. Optimism is precisely tuned by parameters optimism threshold and tolerance. Our experiment showed that being optimistic is better for cooperators as it leads to more accurate exploration in the multi-agen…
The Prisoner's Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the 2-dimensional payoff space in an infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, based on Markov chain analysis and memory-one strategies. We generalize this approach and introduce the concept of strategy parameter to show that linear relations among player payoffs are a ubiquitous feature of the infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our extended analysis is applie…
The spatial Prisoner's Dilemma is a prototype model to show the emergence of cooperation in very competitive environments. It considers players, at site of lattices, that can either cooperate or defect when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with other z players. This model presents a rich phase diagram. Here we consider players in cells of one-dimensional cellular automata. Each player interacts with other z players. This geometry allows us to vary, in a simple manner, the number of neighbors ranging from one up to the lattice size, including self-interaction. This approach has multiple advantage…
We study the possible advantages of adopting of quantum strategies in multi-player evolutionary games. We base our study on the three-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In order to model the simultaneous interaction between three agents we use hypergraphs and hypergraph networks. In particular, we study two types of networks: a random network and a SF-like network. The obtained results show that in the case of a three player game on a hypergraph network, quantum strategies are not necessarily stochastically stable strategies. In some cases, the defection strategy can be as good as a quantum …
We focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperation and sustaining cooperators. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on a variant of Watts-Strogatz small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. Moreover, neither the most heterogeneous case nor …
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a simple model for understanding cooperative patterns in complex systems consisting of selfish individuals. Here, we study a PD game problem in scale-free networks containing hierarchically organized modules and controllable shortcuts connecting separated hubs. We find that cooperator clusters exhibit a percolation transition in the parameter space (p,b), where p is the occupation probability of shortcuts and b is the temptation payoff in the PD game. The cluster size distribution follows a power law at the transition point. Such a critical behavior, resulti…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new connections and thus permanently extend their neighborhoods, provided they have been successful in passing their strategy to the opponents. We show that this simple coevolutionary rule shifts the survival barrier of cooperators towards high temptations to defect and results in highly heterogeneous interaction networks with an exponential fit best characterizing their…
How attention scarcity effects the outcomes of a game? We present our findings on a version of the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) game in which players can accept or refuse to play with their partner. We study the memory size effect on determining the right partner to interact with. We investigate the conditions under which the cooperators are more likely to be advantageous than the defectors. This work demonstrates that, in order to beat defection, players do not need a full memorization of each action of all opponents. There exists a critical attention capacity threshold to beat defectors.…
The Axelrod library is an open source Python package that allows for reproducible game theoretic research into the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. This area of research began in the 1980s but suffers from a lack of documentation and test code. The goal of the library is to provide such a resource, with facilities for the design of new strategies and interactions between them, as well as conducting tournaments and ecological simulations for populations of strategies. With a growing collection of 139 strategies, the library is a also a platform for an original tournament that, in itself, is of inte…
In this paper the results of a simulation of a prisoner's dilemma robin-round tournament are presented. In the tournament each participating strategy plays an iterated prisoner's dilemma against each other strategy (round-robin) and as a variant also against itself. The participants of a tournament are all strategies that are deterministic and have the same size of memory with regard to their own and their opponent's past actions: up to three most recent actions of their opponent and up to two most recent actions of their own. A focus is set on the investigation of the influence of the number …
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is one of the most popular games of the Game Theory due to the emergence of cooperation among competitive rational players. In this paper, we present the PD played in cells of one-dimension cellular automata, where the number of possible neighbors that each cell interacts, z, can vary. This makes possible to retrieve results obtained previously in regular lattices. Exhaustive exploration of the parameters space is presented. We show that the final state of the system is governed mainly by the number of neighbors z and there is a drastic difference if it is even or o…
Emergence of cooperation in self-centered individuals has been a major puzzle in the study of evolutionary ethics. Reciprocal altruism is one of explanations put forward and prisoner's dilemma has been a paradigm in this context. Emergence of cooperation was demonstrated for prisoner's dilemma on a lattice with synchronous update [Nature, 359, 826 (1992)]. However, the cooperation disappeared for asynchronous update and the general validity of the conclusions was questioned [PNAS, 90, 7716 (1993)]. Neither synchronous nor asynchronous updates are realistic for natural systems. In this paper, w…
Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have yielded contradictory results so far---as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game played on different networks have shown that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions, and that the network structure …
The world in which we are living is a huge network of networks and should be described by interdependent networks. The interdependence between networks significantly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on them. Meanwhile, due to the diversity and complexity of social and biological systems, players on different networks may not interact with each other by the same way, which should be described by multiple models in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game. We therefore study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on two interdependent networks…
