Newman-Watts网络上的进化囚徒困境博弈
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Newman-Watts networks
摘要：
研究了一个两策略进化囚徒困境博弈的合作维持问题，博弈中的参与者位于一维链上，他们的收益来自于最近邻和次最近邻的相互作用.所应用的主体几何使得研究两个冲突的拓扑特征的影响成为可能。进化规则中包含了一些噪声，这些噪声会影响参与者之间的策略选择。使用蒙特卡罗模拟和扩展版本的动态平均场论，我们确定了作为噪声水平和支付参数的函数的相图。当连接结构被Newman和Watts建议的额外链接扩展时，图的特殊特征发生了显着变化。
英文摘要：
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest neighbor interactions. The applied host geometry makes possible to study the impacts of two conflicting topological features. The evolutionary rule involves some noise affecting the strategy adoptions between the interacting players. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of dynamical mean-field theory we determined the phase diagram as a function of noise level and a payoff parameter. The peculiar feature of the diagram is changed significantly when the connectivity structure is extended by extra links as suggested by Newman and Watts.
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