进化博弈框架下偏好和模糊因素对舆论动态的影响
Impact of Preference and Equivocators on Opinion Dynamics with Evolutionary Game Framework
摘要：
意见动力学是自然科学和社会科学中最具挑战性的研究课题之一，其目的是通过各种意见的相互作用机制来理解集体行为的演化。为了清楚地阐明这个问题，二元意见模型成为一个有用的框架，其中代理人可以采取独立的意见。受现实观察的启发，本文提出了二元意见模型的两种基本交互机制：一种是所谓的BSO模型，参与者通过持有相同的意见而获益;另一种是BDO模型，参与者通过持有不同的意见而获益。在这两个基本模型的基础上，利用复制者方程（RE）模拟意见演化过程，在演化博弈框架下研究了意见偏好和模糊者对二元意见演化的综合影响。通过大量的模拟，我们展示了二元意见动力学的理论平衡状态，并从数学上分析了每个平衡状态的稳定性。
英文摘要：
Opinion dynamics, aiming to understand the evolution of collective behavior through various interaction mechanisms of opinions, represents one of the most challenges in natural and social science. To elucidate this issue clearly, binary opinion model becomes a useful framework, where agents can take an independent opinion. Inspired by the realistic observations, here we propose two basic interaction mechanisms of binary opinion model: one is the so-called BSO model in which players benefit from holding the same opinion; the other is called BDO model in which players benefit from taking different opinions. In terms of these two basic models, the synthetical effect of opinion preference and equivocators on the evolution of binary opinion is studied under the framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT), where the replicator equation (RE) is employed to mimick the evolution of opinions. By means of numerous simulations, we show the theoretical equilibrium states of binary opinion dynamics, and mathematically analyze the stability of each equilibrium state as well.
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