演化动力系统博弈中的自组织制度
Self-organized institutions in evolutionary dynamical-systems game
AI总结：
本文提出演化动力系统博弈框架，通过公共池资源模型揭示规范与惩罚规则如何从环境-决策耦合演化中自组织形成制度，并分析其稳定性与演化稳健性。
摘要：
社会制度是调节人们行为的共享规范和规则体系，往往在没有外部强制的情况下出现。它们提供了区分合作与背叛的标准，并建立了维持合作的规则，这些规则是在长期试错过程中形成的。尽管已经提出了成功制度的原则，但其涌现背后的机制仍然知之甚少。在此，我们引入演化动力系统博弈这一框架，将博弈行为与环境动力学耦合，并探索决策认知框架的演化。我们分析了一个公共池资源管理的最小模型，其中资源自然增长并被收获。玩家使用决策函数，根据环境和同伴监测来确定每一步是否进行收获。随着这些函数的演化，玩家会检测到自私的收获行为，并通过收获来破坏环境以惩罚这种行为。这一过程导致规范的自组织，将收获行为分类为合作性、背叛性或惩罚性。涌现出的“合作性”规范和惩罚规则充当了制度。环境和玩家状态收敛到以极限环为特征的不同模式，代表了社会生态系统中的时间规律性。尽管决策存在轻微变化，这些模式仍然保持稳定，说明了制度的稳定性。决策函数的演化稳健性可作为制度演化有利性的度量，突出了可塑性在应对多样化对手中的作用。这项工作引入了演化动力系统博弈的基础概念，并通过建模生态动力学与人类决策之间的相互作用，阐明了制度自组织背后的机制。
英文摘要：
Social institutions are systems of shared norms and rules that regulate people's behaviors, often emerging without external enforcement. They provide criteria to distinguish cooperation from defection and establish rules to sustain cooperation, shaped through long-term trial and error. While principles for successful institutions have been proposed, the mechanisms underlying their emergence remain poorly understood. Here, we introduce the evolutionary dynamical-systems game, a framework that couples game actions with environmental dynamics and explores the evolution of cognitive frameworks for decision-making. We analyze a minimal model of common-pool resource management, where resources grow naturally and are harvested. Players use decision-making functions to determine whether to harvest at each step, based on environmental and peer monitoring. As these functions evolve, players detect selfish harvesting and punish it by degrading the environment through harvesting. This process leads to the self-organization of norms that classify harvesting actions as cooperative, defective, or punitive. The emergent norms for ``cooperativeness'' and rules of punishment serve as institutions. The environmental and players' states converge to distinct modes characterized by limit-cycles, representing temporal regularities in socio-ecological systems. These modes remain stable despite slight variations in decision-making, illustrating the stability of institutions. The evolutionary robustness of decision-making functions serves as a measure of the evolutionary favorability of institutions, highlighting the role of plasticity in responding to diverse opponents. This work introduces foundational concepts in evolutionary dynamical-systems games and elucidates the mechanisms underlying the self-organization of institutions by modeling the interplay between ecological dynamics and human decision-making.
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