从空间演化博弈视角看监督税收合规与逃避
Supervised tax compliance and evasion from a spatial evolutionary game perspective
AI总结：
本文通过互依网络模型研究税收系统中公民与监管者共演化问题，揭示强化惩罚、提高监管者薪资及打击腐败对提升税收合规率的作用，提出平衡威慑与制度公平的政策建议。
摘要：
税收是现代国家经济体系中的基本组成部分，对社会运作和政府运作产生深远影响。本文采用互依网络方法，构建税收系统中公民与监管者共演化模型，该模型本质上是一个公共物品博弈框架，具有复杂的互动动态。在博弈层，公民面临税收合规（合作）与逃避（背叛）的社会困境。税收合规支持公共财政的可持续性，而税收逃避则提供更强的短期激励。在监管层，公正的监管者惩罚逃税者，而腐败的监管者因受贿而保持沉默。政府监管干预引入关键的制度约束，改变传统博弈的均衡。重要的是，策略更新不仅发生在公民之间，也发生在监管者之间。研究结果表明，加强惩罚可以有效遏制逃税，而贿赂对税收合规率和公正监管者比例的影响是非线性的。此外，提高监管者薪资和加强打击腐败监管者可以促进公正监管者的出现，从而减少公民的逃税行为。结果提供了实际政策含义，表明平衡威慑与制度公平是维持合规的关键，同时也指出未来需要实证验证和模型扩展。
英文摘要：
Taxation constitutes a fundamental component of modern national economic systems, exerting profound impacts on both societal functioning and governmental operations. In this paper, we employ an interdependent network approach to model the coevolution between citizens and regulators within a taxation system that fundamentally constitutes a public goods game framework with complex interactive dynamics. In a game layer, citizens engage in public goods games, facing the social dilemma of tax compliance (cooperation) versus evasion (defection). Tax compliance supports the sustainability of public finances while tax evasion presents markedly stronger short-term incentives. In a regulatory layer, fair regulators punish tax evaders, while corrupt regulators keep silent due to bribes. Governmental regulatory interventions introduce critical institutional constraints that alter the traditional equilibrium of the game. Importantly, there exists a strategy update not only among citizens but also among regulators. Our results indicate that strengthening penalties can effectively curb tax evasion, and the influence of bribery on both tax compliance rates and the proportion of fair regulators is nonlinear. Additionally, increasing regulators' salaries and intensifying the crackdown on corrupt regulators can foster the emergence of fair regulators, thereby reducing tax evasion among citizens. The results offer practical policy implications, suggesting that balanced deterrence and institutional fairness are essential to sustaining compliance, and point to the need for future empirical validation and model extensions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
