基于三态动力学代理的逃税动态分析模型
A three-state kinetic agent-based model to analyze tax evasion dynamics
摘要：
在这项工作中，我们研究了逃税问题的一个完全连接的人口。为此，我们认为，代理人可能在三个不同的国家，即诚实的纳税人，逃税者和未定，这是一个中间类之间的诚实和逃税者的个人。每个人都可以改变他/她的状态后，动力学交换观点动力学学，其中代理人相互作用对竞争性的负面（概率$q$）和积极（概率$1-q$）耦合，代表协议/代理对之间的分歧。此外，我们考虑的惩罚规则的Zaklan经济物理模型，有一个概率$p_{a}$的审计每个代理人都受到在每个时期和时间长度$k$检测逃税者保持诚实。我们的研究结果表明，低于临界点$q_{c}=1/4$的观点动力学的遵守是高的，和惩罚规则有一个小的影响，在人口。另一方面，对$q>q_{c}$来说，执行机制可以大大减少逃税。我们还讨论了未决定的代理人在系统的演化中的存在的影响。
英文摘要：
In this work we study the problem of tax evasion on a fully-connected population. For this purpose, we consider that the agents may be in three different states, namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and undecided, that are individuals in an intermediate class among honests and evaders. Every individual can change his/her state following a kinetic exchange opinion dynamics, where the agents interact by pairs with competitive negative (with probability $q$) and positive (with probability $1-q$) couplings, representing agreement/disagreement between pairs of agents. In addition, we consider the punishment rules of the Zaklan econophysics model, for which there is a probability $p_{a}$ of an audit each agent is subject to in every period and a length of time $k$ detected tax evaders remain honest. Our results suggest that below the critical point $q_{c}=1/4$ of the opinion dynamics the compliance is high, and the punishment rules have a small effect in the population. On the other hand, for $q>q_{c}$ the tax evasion can be considerably reduced by the enforcement mechanism. We also discuss the impact of the presence of the undecided agents in the evolution of the system.
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