进化博弈中的相互信任与合作
Mutual Trust and Cooperation in the Evolutionary Hawks-Doves Game
摘要：
使用一个新的动态网络模型的社会中，成对的相互作用加权根据相互满意度，我们表明，合作是规范的鹰鸽游戏时，个人被允许打破与不受欢迎的邻居的关系，并使新的熟人在他们的扩展附近。此外，合作对于相当强的策略扰动是稳健的。我们还讨论了新兴网络的经验结构，以及允许合作者在人群中茁壮成长的原因。考虑到这种博弈对于社会互动的重要性，这是一个令人鼓舞的积极结果，因为大型混合种群的标准理论规定，一定比例的叛逃者必须始终存在于平衡状态。
英文摘要：
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.
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