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arXiv 1608.01875cs.GT
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非真实机制的样本复杂度

Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms

Jason Hartline, Samuel Taggart

摘要:

本文从样本出发,研究了非真实机制的设计问题。我们确定了一系列参数化机制,具有战略上简单的赢家付费竞标、全付费和真实支付格式。在一般(不一定向下封闭)单参数的可行性环境中,我们证明了家庭具有低的代表性和泛化误差。具体而言,多项式许多投标样本足以识别和运行$ε$ -接近贝叶斯-纳什均衡的收入或福利的最佳真实机制具有高概率的机制。

英文摘要:

This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily downward-closed) single-parameter feasibility environments we prove that the family has low representation and generalization error. Specifically, polynomially many bid samples suffice to identify and run a mechanism that is $ε$-close in Bayes-Nash equilibrium revenue or welfare to that of the optimal truthful mechanism with high probability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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