arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1003.5480cs.GT
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Truthful Fair分部

Truthful Fair Division

Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz

摘要:

我们解决公平分配或切蛋糕的问题,目的是找到真正的机制。在一般的措施空间(“蛋糕”)和非原子的情况下,添加剂的个人偏好措施-或实用程序-我们表明,存在一个真实的“机制”,确保每个玩家的k得到至少1/k的蛋糕。这种机制也最大限度地减少了诚实玩家的风险。此外,在存在至少两个不同的措施的情况下,我们提出了一个不同的真实机制,确保每个球员得到超过1/k的蛋糕。然后,我们将注意力转向具有有限效用和大量商品的不可分割商品的分割。在这里,我们提供了类似的机制,但具有稍微弱的保证。这些保证收敛到那些在非原子的情况下获得的商品的数量达到无穷大。

英文摘要:

We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that there exists a truthful "mechanism" which ensures that each of the k players gets at least 1/k of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets more than 1/k of the cake. We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees. These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods goes to infinity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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