Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Fully Verifiable Settings

Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Market Applications

Recently, a novel class of incentive mechanisms is proposed to attract extensive users to truthfully participate in crowd sensing applications with a given budget constraint. The class mechanisms also bring good service quality for the requesters in crowd sensing applications. Although it is so important, there still exists many verification and privacy challenges, including users' bids and subtask information privacy and identification privacy, winners' set privacy of the platform, and the security of the payment outcomes. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving verifiable incentive me…

博弈论中的非强制性勒索

Non-coercive extortion in game theory

本研究提出一种基于结果依存支付承诺的非强制性勒索机制，通过将序贯性引入同时行动博弈实现奖励式利润榨取，推导了成功条件、适用博弈类别及极值收益，揭示了竞争环境的策略脆弱性，拓展了博弈论承诺研究的边界。

Solving the Buyer and Seller's Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator

A fundamental problem for electronic commerce is the buying and selling of digital goods between individuals that may not know or trust each other. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed by the use of trusted third-parties such as credit-card companies, mediated escrows, legal adjudication, or reputation systems. Despite the rise of blockchain protocols as a way to send payments without trusted third parties, the important problem of exchanging a digital good for payment without trusted third parties has been paid much less attention. We refer to this problem as the Buyer and Seller's …

胡萝卜与大棒：诱导比较数据及其他应用

Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and Beyond

针对主观比较数据难以真实诱导的问题，提出基于强随机传递性的奖惩式同伴预测机制，实现说真话为最优策略的对称强真实均衡，并拓展至伊辛模型下的网络化数据场景，经真实数据集验证理论结论。

通过排序执行规则

Rule Enforcing Through Ordering

针对大量违规者因风险低而拒缴罚款的问题，提出一种基于公开排序的惩罚处理机制，理论和实验证明该机制能有效激励个人及联盟缴纳罚款，显著提升中央机构的预期总收款额。

General Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Markets

In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving good service quality, especially under a given budget constraint condition. To this end, recently, Singer et al. propose a novel class of auction mechanisms for determining near-optimal prices of tasks for crowdsourcing markets constrained by the given budget. Their mechanisms are very useful to motivate extensive user to truthfully participate in crowdsourcing m…