论机械机制设计中的随机化能力
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
摘要:
在许多情况下,真实机制的力量受到严格的限制。在本文中,我们使用随机化来克服这个问题。特别是,我们构建了一个FPTAS多单位拍卖,是真实的期望,而有证据表明,没有多项式时间的真实确定性机制提供了一个近似比优于2。我们还首次表明,真实的期望多项式时间机制是\emph{provably}强于多项式时间普遍真实的机制。具体来说,我们表明,有一个设置,其中:(1)有一个非多项式时间的真实机制,总是输出最优解,(2)没有普遍真实的随机机制可以提供一个近似比优于2的多项式时间,但(3)FPTAS是真实的期望存在。
英文摘要:
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomial-time truthful deterministic mechanism provides an approximation ratio better than 2. We also show for the first time that truthful in expectation polynomial-time mechanisms are \emph{provably} stronger than polynomial-time universally truthful mechanisms. Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a non-polynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 in polynomial time, but (3) an FPTAS that is truthful in expectation exists.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。