arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1409.4503cs.GTcs.CR
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审计具有多个防御者资源的游戏

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha

摘要:

现代组织(例如,医院、社交网络、政府机构)严重依赖审计来检测和惩罚不适当地访问和披露机密信息的内部人员。最近的工作审计游戏模型之间的战略互动的审计师与一个单一的审计资源和审计Stackelberg游戏,增强相关的研究安全游戏与可配置的惩罚参数。我们显着推广这个审计游戏模型,以考虑多个审计资源,每个资源被限制为审计所有潜在的违规行为的子集,从而使应用程序到实际的审计场景。我们提供了一个FPTAS,计算得到的非凸优化问题的近似最优解。主要的技术新颖性是在设计和正确性证明的优化转换,使建设这个FPTAS。此外,我们的实验表明,这种转换显着加快了一类审计游戏和安全游戏的解决方案的计算。

英文摘要:

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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