arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1303.0356cs.GTcs.CR
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审计游戏

Audit Games

Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Arunesh Sinha

摘要:

要有效地执行法律和政策,就需要投入资源来预防和侦查犯罪者,并制定适当的惩罚计划来威慑违法者。特别是,在拥有大量个人信息的现代组织中执行隐私法律和政策(例如,医院、银行和网络服务提供商)严重依赖内部审计机制。我们研究在设计这些机制时的经济考虑,特别侧重于有效的资源分配和适当的惩罚计划。我们提出了一个审计博弈模型,这是一个自然推广的标准安全博弈模型的资源分配与额外的惩罚参数。计算这个游戏的Stackelberg均衡是具有挑战性的,因为它涉及到解决非凸二次约束的优化问题。我们提出了一个添加剂的FPTAS,有效地计算一个解决方案,是任意接近的最优解。

英文摘要:

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks, and Web services providers) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes a solution that is arbitrarily close to the optimal solution.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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