Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks, and Web services providers) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes a solution that is arbitrarily close to the optimal solution.
Integrative Experiments Identify How Punishment Impacts Welfare in Public Goods Games
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院);Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院数据、系统与社会研究所);The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院);Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学计算机与信息科学系);Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学安纳伯格传播学院)
Post-Disaster Resource Redistribution and Cooperation Evolution Based on Two-Layer Network Evolutionary Games
Northwestern Polytechnical University(西北工业大学);Shaanxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Game Theory and Information Processing at Higher Education Institutions(陕西省高校智能博弈与信息处理重点实验室);Nanjing University of Science and Technology(南京理工大学)
Get Your Workload in Order: Game Theoretic Prioritization of Database Auditing
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Vanderbilt University(范德堡大学电气工程与计算机科学系);Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley(加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校电气工程与计算机科学系);Department of Computer Science, University of Houston(休斯顿大学计算机科学系);Department of Biomedical Informatics, Vanderbilt University(范德堡大学生物医学信息学系)