Moving target defense has emerged as a critical paradigm of protecting a vulnerable system against persistent and stealthy attacks. To protect a system, a defender proactively changes the system configurations to limit the exposure of security vulnerabilities to potential attackers. In doing so, the defender creates asymmetric uncertainty and complexity for the attackers, making it much harder for them to compromise the system. In practice, the defender incurs a switching cost for each migration of the system configurations. The switching cost usually depends on both the current configuration and the following configuration. Besides, different system configurations typically require a different amount of time for an attacker to exploit and attack. Therefore, a defender must simultaneously decide both the optimal sequences of system configurations and the optimal timing for switching. In this paper, we propose a Markov Stackelberg Game framework to precisely characterize the defender's spatial and temporal decision-making in the face of advanced attackers. We introduce a relative value iteration algorithm that computes the defender's optimal moving target defense strategies. Empirical evaluation on real-world problems demonstrates the advantages of the Markov Stackelberg game model for spatial-temporal moving target defense.
As an effective approach to thwarting advanced attacks, moving target defense (MTD) has been applied to various domains. Previous works on MTD, however, mainly focus on deciding the sequence of system configurations to be used and have largely ignored the equally important timing problem. Given that both the migration cost and attack time vary over system configurations, it is crucial to jointly optimize the spatial and temporal decisions in MTD to better protect the system from persistent threats. In this work, we propose a Stackelberg game model for MTD where the defender commits to a joint …
The field of cybersecurity has mostly been a cat-and-mouse game with the discovery of new attacks leading the way. To take away an attacker's advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed proactive defense methods such as Moving Target Defense (MTD). To find good movement strategies, researchers have modeled MTD as leader-follower games between the defender and a cyber-adversary. We argue that existing models are inadequate in sequential settings when there is incomplete information about a rational adversary and yield sub-optimal movement strategies. Further, while there exists an ar…
In this paper, we study the problem of assessing the effectiveness of a proactive defense-by-detection policy with a network-based moving target defense. We model the network system using a probabilistic attack graph--a graphical security model. Given a network system with a proactive defense strategy, an intelligent attacker needs to perform reconnaissance repeatedly to learn about the locations of intrusion detection systems and re-plan optimally to reach the target while avoiding detection. To compute the attacker's strategy for security evaluation, we develop a receding-horizon planning al…
Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a key technique in various security applications as it takes away the attacker's ability to perform reconnaissance for exploiting a system's vulnerabilities. However, most of the existing research in the field assumes unrealistic access to information about the attacker's motivations and/or actions when developing MTD strategies. Many of the existing approaches also assume complete knowledge regarding the vulnerabilities of a system and how each of these vulnerabilities can be exploited by an attacker. In this work, we aim to create algorithms that ge…
University of Houston（休斯顿大学）；Washington University in St. Louis（圣路易斯华盛顿大学）
Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense approach that aims to thwart attacks by continuously changing the attack surface of a system (e.g., changing host or network configurations), thereby increasing the adversary's uncertainty and attack cost. To maximize the impact of MTD, a defender must strategically choose when and what changes to make, taking into account both the characteristics of its system as well as the adversary's observed activities. Finding an optimal strategy for MTD presents a significant challenge, especially when facing a resourceful and determined adversary who m…
Arizona State University（亚利桑那州立大学）；IBM Research（IBM研究院）
Present attack methods can make state-of-the-art classification systems based on deep neural networks misclassify every adversarially modified test example. The design of general defense strategies against a wide range of such attacks still remains a challenging problem. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fields of cybersecurity and multi-agent systems and propose to leverage the concept of Moving Target Defense (MTD) in designing a meta-defense for 'boosting' the robustness of an ensemble of deep neural networks (DNNs) for visual classification tasks against such adversarial attacks.…
Online Learning in Stackelberg Security Games with Time-Varying Attack Intensities
Robotics and Autonomous Systems Thrust, Systems Hub, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)（香港科技大学（广州）系统枢纽机器人与自主系统推力）；Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida（中佛罗里达大学电气与计算机工程系）
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in practice due to subjective or objective factors, and then the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy may be an alternative option. In this case, the leader may face a dilemma of choosing an SE strategy or an NE strategy. In this paper, we focus on a unified three-player leader-follower security game and study the coincidence between SE and NE. We first explore a necessar…
Reactive defense mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems, have made significant efforts to secure a system or network for the last several decades. However, the nature of reactive security mechanisms has limitations because potential attackers cannot be prevented in advance. We are facing a reality with the proliferation of persistent, advanced, intelligent attacks while defenders are often way behind attackers in taking appropriate actions to thwart potential attackers. The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive defense mechanism aiming to prevent attacks. I…
Electric power grid components, such as high voltage transformers (HVTs), generating stations, substations, etc. are expensive to maintain and, in the event of failure, replace. Thus, regularly monitoring the behavior of such components is of utmost importance. Furthermore, the recent increase in the number of cyberattacks on such systems demands that such monitoring strategies should be robust. In this paper, we draw inspiration from work in Moving Target Defense (MTD) and consider a dynamic monitoring strategy that makes it difficult for an attacker to prevent unique identification of behavi…
The processing and storage of critical data in large-scale cloud networks necessitate the need for scalable security solutions. It has been shown that deploying all possible security measures incurs a cost on performance by using up valuable computing and networking resources which are the primary selling points for cloud service providers. Thus, there has been a recent interest in developing Moving Target Defense (MTD) mechanisms that helps one optimize the joint objective of maximizing security while ensuring that the impact on performance is minimized. Often, these techniques model the prob…
Harvard（哈佛大学）；University of Southern California（南加州大学）
Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an adversary's response to defense on a limited set of targets, we study the problem of learning a defense that generalizes well to a new set of targets with novel feature values and combinations. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed via a two-stage approach where an adversary model is trained to maximize predictive accuracy without considering the defender's …
The rapid development of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is the significant incentive to contribute in the vulnerable applications such as cognitive radio (CR). This paper proposes a Stackelberg game approach to enhance the WSN-based CR security against the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack and conserve the consequent lost power consumption. The attack aims to corrupt the spectrum decision by imposing interference power to the delivered reports from the sensor nodes (SNs) to the fusion center (FC) to make a protection level below a specific threshold. The proposed model utilize…
With the increasing diversity of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, it is becoming extremely challenging to design a fully protected network. For instance, Stealthy Link Flooding Attack (SLFA) is a variant of DDoS attacks that strives to block access to a target area by flooding a small set of links, and it is shown that it can bypass traditional DDoS defense mechanisms. One potential solution to tackle such SLFAs is to apply Moving Target Defense (MTD) techniques in which network settings are dynamically changed to confuse/deceive attackers, thus making it highly expensive to launc…
University of Oregon（俄勒冈大学）；Singapore Management University（新加坡管理大学）
This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's behavior. This attack manipulation eventually influences the defender's patrol strategy towards the attacker's benefit. Previous work along this line of research only focuses on one-shot games in which the defender learns the attacker's behavior and then designs a corresponding strategy only once. Our work, on the other hand, investigates the long-term impact …
