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arXiv 1407.8540cs.CRcs.GT
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移动目标网络防御的自适应攻击策略研究

Adaptive Attacker Strategy Development Against Moving Target Cyber Defenses

M. L. Winterrose, K. M. Carter, N. Wagner, W. W. Streilein

摘要:

一个战略制定模型被用来研究自适应攻击者如何学习克服移动目标网络防御。攻击者-防御者的交互被建模为一个游戏,其中防御者部署一个临时的平台迁移防御。针对这种防御,攻击者群体开发了指定资源投资的时间顺序的策略,这些策略使目标零日漏洞得以存在。攻击者响应两个防御者的时间平台迁移调度策略进行了检查。在第一防御者调度策略中,防御者从可用平台池中均匀随机地选择每场比赛中的活动平台。在第二种策略中,防御者安排每个连续的平台,以最大限度地提高提交给攻击者的源代码的多样性。自适应攻击者响应策略是由有限状态机(FSM)结构建模的,该结构在模拟对抗防御者策略的过程中通过进化算法进化。它表明,攻击者学会了大量投资于利用创建的平台与其他平台的相似性最小时,面对多样性防御,同时避免投资于利用这个最不相似的平台时,面对随机化防御。此外,它表明,多样性最大化的防御是优越的较短的持续时间的攻击者-防御者的参与,但在扩展的攻击者-防御者的互动次优。

英文摘要:

A model of strategy formulation is used to study how an adaptive attacker learns to overcome a moving target cyber defense. The attacker-defender interaction is modeled as a game in which a defender deploys a temporal platform migration defense. Against this defense, a population of attackers develop strategies specifying the temporal ordering of resource investments that bring targeted zero-day exploits into existence. Attacker response to two defender temporal platform migration scheduling policies are examined. In the first defender scheduling policy, the defender selects the active platform in each match uniformly at random from a pool of available platforms. In the second policy the defender schedules each successive platform to maximize the diversity of the source code presented to the attacker. Adaptive attacker response strategies are modeled by finite state machine (FSM) constructs that evolve during simulated play against defender strategies via an evolutionary algorithm. It is demonstrated that the attacker learns to invest heavily in exploit creation for the platform with the least similarity to other platforms when faced with a diversity defense, while avoiding investment in exploits for this least similar platform when facing a randomization defense. Additionally, it is demonstrated that the diversity-maximizing defense is superior for shorter duration attacker-defender engagements, but performs sub-optimally in extended attacker-defender interactions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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