基于检测约束的网络物理系统最优攻击策略
Optimal Attack Strategies Subject to Detection Constraints Against Cyber-Physical Systems
摘要：
本文研究了针对网络物理系统（CPS）的攻击者，其目标是将CPS的状态移动到目标状态，同时确保他或她被检测到的概率不超过给定的界限。攻击者被检测到的概率与他或她对CPS检测统计的攻击所引起的非负偏差有关。我们制定了一个线性二次费用函数，捕获攻击者的控制目标，并建立约束的诱导偏差，反映了攻击者的检测-避免目标。当攻击者被限制在检测器的虚警率被检测到时，我们证明了最优攻击策略减少到攻击者的状态估计的线性反馈。在攻击者的偏见是一个正常数的上限的情况下，我们提供了两种算法-最佳算法和一个次优的，计算密集度较低的算法-找到合适的攻击序列。最后，我们说明我们的攻击策略的数值例子的基础上的遥控直升机攻击。
英文摘要：
This paper studies an attacker against a cyber-physical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker's probability of being detected is related to the nonnegative bias induced by his or her attack on the CPS' detection statistic. We formulate a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker's control goal and establish constraints on the induced bias that reflect the attacker's detection-avoidance objectives. When the attacker is constrained to be detected at the false-alarm rate of the detector, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. In the case that the attacker's bias is upper bounded by a positive constant, we provide two algorithms -- an optimal algorithm and a sub-optimal, less computationally intensive algorithm -- to find suitable attack sequences. Finally, we illustrate our attack strategies in numerical examples based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
