智能电网中屏蔽线路停电和拓扑攻击的局部网-物攻击
Local Cyber-Physical Attack for Masking Line Outage and Topology Attack in Smart Grid
摘要：
电力系统中的恶意攻击如果不及时处理，最终可能导致大规模的级联故障。这些攻击传统上分为\emph{physical}和\emph{cyber attacks}，可以通过使用最新和先进的检测机制来避免。然而，一种名为\emph{cyber-physical attacks}的新威胁，它联合针对系统的物理层和网络层，以干扰电网的运行，与传统的攻击相比更具恶意。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的网络物理攻击策略，传输线首先物理断开，然后线路中断事件被掩盖，使控制中心被误导检测到一个明显的线路中断在不同的位置在电力系统的局部区域。因此，控制中心中的拓扑信息受到我们的攻击的干扰。我们还提出了一种新的脆弱线的选择程序，并分析了我们提出的框架的可观测性。我们所提出的方法可以有效地和连续欺骗控制中心检测假的线路停电的位置，从而增加了级联故障的机会，因为假停电的注意力。仿真结果验证了该攻击策略的有效性。
英文摘要：
Malicious attacks in the power system can eventually result in a large-scale cascade failure if not attended on time. These attacks, which are traditionally classified into \emph{physical} and \emph{cyber attacks}, can be avoided by using the latest and advanced detection mechanisms. However, a new threat called \emph{cyber-physical attacks} which jointly target both the physical and cyber layers of the system to interfere the operations of the power grid is more malicious as compared with the traditional attacks. In this paper, we propose a new cyber-physical attack strategy where the transmission line is first physically disconnected, and then the line-outage event is masked, such that the control center is misled into detecting as an obvious line outage at a different position in the local area of the power system. Therefore, the topology information in the control center is interfered by our attack. We also propose a novel procedure for selecting vulnerable lines, and analyze the observability of our proposed framework. Our proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive the control center into detecting fake line-outage positions, and thereby increase the chance of cascade failure because the attention is given to the fake outage. The simulation results validate the efficiency of our proposed attack strategy.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
