一般网络物理攻击下的电网状态估计
Power Grid State Estimation under General Cyber-Physical Attacks
摘要:
电网网络物理攻击的有效防御需要在受攻击区域内进行准确的损害评估。虽然已经提出了一些解决方案来恢复相位角和链路状态(即,断路器状态),现有的解决方案做出了电网在攻击之后保持连接的限制性假设。为了填补这一空白,我们研究的问题恢复的相位角和链路状态下的一般网络物理攻击,可能会分区成岛屿的网格。为此,我们(i)表明,现有的解决方案和恢复条件仍然成立,如果在攻击区域的攻击后的功率注入是已知的,和(ii)提出了一个基于线性规划的算法,可以完美地恢复链路状态在一定条件下,即使攻击后的功率注入是未知的。我们的数值评估的基础上,波兰电网表明,该算法是高度准确的定位故障链路的相位角是已知的。
英文摘要:
Effective defense against cyber-physical attacks in power grid requires the capability of accurate damage assessment within the attacked area. While some solutions have been proposed to recover the phase angles and the link status (i.e., breaker status) within the attacked area, existing solutions made the limiting assumption that the grid stays connected after the attack. To fill this gap, we study the problem of recovering the phase angles and the link status under a general cyber-physical attack that may partition the grid into islands. To this end, we (i) show that the existing solutions and recovery conditions still hold if the post-attack power injections in the attacked area are known, and (ii) propose a linear programming-based algorithm that can perfectly recover the link status under certain conditions even if the post-attack power injections are unknown. Our numerical evaluations based on the Polish power grid demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is highly accurate in localizing failed links once the phase angles are known.
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