基础设施网络中感知资源受限的入侵检测：一种博弈论方法
Resource-Aware Intrusion Detection in Infrastructure Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文针对基础设施网络入侵检测的资源受限问题，将攻防互动建模为图安全博弈，开发算法求解均衡，为资源分配提供策略支撑。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
基础设施网络日益依赖分布式传感来在攻击者抵达高价值资产前检测入侵，但传感设备、通信资源与边缘服务器容量有限，而智能攻击者可调整路线以规避部署的防御。受集成传感与通信（ISAC）启发，本文研究在防御者与攻击者的策略互动下应如何分配传感与处理资源，将二者互动建模为图安全博弈：防御者在资源与误报约束下部署传感动作，攻击者选择通往高价值目标的路线。本文考虑同时博弈及攻击者观察到防御者纯配置或混合策略的情形，分析刻画了纳什均衡与斯塔克尔伯格均衡的存在性、结构及计算复杂度，揭示攻击者对防御的观察如何影响均衡行为，以及最优策略何时难以计算。本文开发了能构建有效纯配置、为混合纳什与混合斯塔克尔伯格博弈优化受限博弈的算法；在可枚举实例中，其解与完全枚举参考的平均归一化差异较小，该方法也适用于无法穷举策略枚举的情形；此外还明确了纳什与混合斯塔克尔伯格收益排序或重合的条件。
英文摘要
Infrastructure networks increasingly rely on distributed sensing to detect intrusions before attackers reach valuable assets. Yet sensing devices, communication resources, and edge server capacity are limited, while intelligent attackers can adapt their routes to the deployed defense. Motivated by integrated sensing and communication (ISAC), we study how sensing and processing resources should be allocated under strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker. We formulate their interaction as a graph security game in which the defender deploys sensing actions under resource and false alarm constraints, while the attacker selects routes to valuable targets. We consider simultaneous play and settings in which the attacker observes either a pure defender configuration or a mixed defender strategy. Our analysis characterizes the existence, structure, and computational complexity of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, showing how the attacker's observation of the defense affects equilibrium behavior and when optimal strategies become difficult to compute. We develop algorithms that construct effective pure configurations and refine restricted games for mixed Nash and mixed Stackelberg play. On enumerable instances, their solutions have small mean normalized differences from fully enumerated references; the methods also apply when exhaustive strategy enumeration is impractical. We also identify conditions under which Nash and mixed Stackelberg payoffs are ordered or coincide.
