arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1906.02774cs.GT
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连通子图防御游戏

Connected Subgraph Defense Games

Eleni C. Akrida, Argyrios Deligkas, Themistoklis Melissourgos, Paul G. Spirakis

摘要:

我们研究了一个$defender$和$k$ $attackers$之间的网络安全博弈。每个攻击者都以概率的方式选择网络中的一个节点进行破坏。防御者也是概率性地选择$λ$节点网络的一个连通导出子图进行扫描和清理,每个攻击者都希望最大化逃避防御者清理的概率。另一方面,防御者的目标是最大化她捕获的攻击者的预期数量。这个博弈是Mavronicolas等人的开创性论文“防御的价格”(MFCS'06)中模型的推广。我们感兴趣的纳什均衡(NE)的这个游戏,以及在表征$optimal$网络,允许最好的$equilibrium$ $defense$ $ratio$,称为价格的防御;这是$k$的比例超过预期数量的攻击者,防御者在NE捕获。我们提供了这个游戏和防御最优网络的NE的特征。这使我们能够表明,游戏的NE重合独立于攻击者的协调与否。此外,我们给出了一个算法计算网元。我们的算法在最坏的情况下需要指数时间,但对于$λ$不断接近1或$n$,它是多项式时间。对于树网络的特殊情况下,我们完善我们的表征,使我们能够推导出一个多项式时间算法,用于决定一棵树是否是防御最优的,如果是这种情况下,它计算一个防御最优NE。另一方面,我们证明了它是NP-难找到一个最佳的防御策略,如果树不是防御最优的。我们补充这个负面的结果与多项式时间常数-近似算法计算的解决方案,接近一般图形的最佳。最后,我们为任何$λ$的防御价格提供了渐近(几乎)紧界。

英文摘要:

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced subgraph of the network of $λ$ nodes to scan and clean.Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping her cleaning by the defender. On the other hand, the goal of the defender is to maximize the expected number of attackers that she catches. This game is a generalization of the model from the seminal paper of Mavronicolas et al. "The price of defense" (MFCS'06). We are interested in Nash equilibria (NE) of this game, as well as in characterizing $defense$-$optimal$ networks which allow for the best $equilibrium$ $defense$ $ratio$, termed Price of Defense; this is the ratio of $k$ over the expected number of attackers that the defender catches in a NE. We provide characterizations of the NEs of this game and defense-optimal networks. This allows us to show that the NEs of the game coincide independently from the coordination or not of the attackers. In addition, we give an algorithm for computing NEs. Our algorithm requires exponential time in the worst case, but it is polynomial-time for $λ$ constantly close to 1 or $n$. For the special case of tree-networks, we refine our characterization which allows us to derive a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether a tree is defense-optimal and if this is the case it computes a defense-optimal NE. On the other hand, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a best-defense strategy if the tree is not defense-optimal. We complement this negative result with a polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm that computes solutions that are close to optimal ones for general graphs. Finally, we provide asymptotically (almost) tight bounds for the Price of Defense for any $λ$.

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