arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 1508.01950cs.GT
收藏

有限资源下多节点防御隐身攻击的博弈分析

Defending Against Stealthy Attacks on Multiple Nodes with Limited Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Ming Zhang, Zizhan Zheng, Ness B. Shroff

摘要:

隐形攻击是主要的网络安全威胁。在实践中,攻击者和防御者都有资源限制,这可能会限制他们的能力。因此,要制定强大的防御战略,一个有前途的方法是利用博弈论来理解所涉及的基本权衡。然而,以前的工作在这个方向上,主要集中在单节点的情况下,没有考虑严格的资源约束。本文提出了一个保护多节点系统免受隐身攻击的博弈模型。我们考虑的实际设置中的频率的攻击和防御是有限的资源的限制,和一个不对称的反馈结构,攻击者可以充分观察节点的状态,同时在很大程度上隐藏其行动的防御者。我们刻画了攻击者和防御者在非自适应策略和自适应策略空间中的最佳反应策略,并研究了博弈的纳什均衡。我们进一步研究了一个序贯博弈,其中防御者首先宣布其策略,然后攻击者相应地作出反应,并设计了一个算法,找到一个接近最优的策略,为防御者提交。

英文摘要:

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize game theory to understand the fundamental trade-offs involved. Previous works in this direction, however, mainly focus on the single-node case without considering strict resource constraints. In this paper, a game-theoretic model for protecting a system of multiple nodes against stealthy attacks is proposed. We consider the practical setting where the frequencies of both attack and defense are constrained by limited resources, and an asymmetric feedback structure where the attacker can fully observe the states of nodes while largely hiding its actions from the defender. We characterize the best response strategies for both attacker and defender in the space of both non-adaptive and adaptive strategies, and study the Nash Equilibria of the game. We further study a sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly, and design an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑