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arXiv 1505.07548cs.GTcs.AI
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Multidefender安全游戏

Multidefender Security Games

Vanderbilt University(范德堡大学);University of California at Davis(加州大学戴维斯分校);Sandia National Laboratories(桑迪亚国家实验室)

Jian Lou, Andrew M. Smith, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

摘要:

Stackelberg安全博弈模型和相关的计算工具已经在一些高后果的安全设置中部署,例如LAX犬巡逻和联邦空军元帅服务。这些模型专注于只有一个防守者的孤立系统,尽管它们是一个更复杂的多人系统的一部分。此外,许多真实系统,如交通网络和电网,都表现出目标之间的相互依赖性,因此,也表现出共同负责保护目标的决策者之间的相互依赖性。为了理解这种多防御者的战略互动存在于安全,我们研究了多个防御者的安全游戏的博弈论模型。与大多数先前的分析不同,我们专注于每个防御者必须保护多个目标的情况,因此即使是单个防御者的最佳对策决策也是非常重要的。我们开始与独立目标的多防御者安全游戏的分析调查,提供了一个均衡和价格的无政府状态分析的三个模型越来越普遍。在所有的模型中,我们发现防御者都有过度保护目标的动机,有时甚至是显著的。此外,在更简单的模型中,我们发现无政府状态的无政府代价是无限的,防御者的数量和每个防御者的目标数量都是线性增加的。考虑到目标之间的相互依赖性,我们开发了一种新的混合整数线性规划公式来计算防守者的最佳对策,并利用这种公式近似纳什均衡的游戏。我们将这种方法应用于代表相互依赖关系的几种网络模型的计算战略分析,包括现实世界的电力网络。我们的分析表明,网络结构和故障传播的概率如何决定防御者对安全投资过度或不足的倾向。

英文摘要:

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems with only one defender, despite being part of a more complex system with multiple players. Furthermore, many real systems such as transportation networks and the power grid exhibit interdependencies between targets and, consequently, between decision makers jointly charged with protecting them. To understand such multidefender strategic interactions present in security, we investigate game theoretic models of security games with multiple defenders. Unlike most prior analysis, we focus on the situations in which each defender must protect multiple targets, so that even a single defender's best response decision is, in general, highly non-trivial. We start with an analytical investigation of multidefender security games with independent targets, offering an equilibrium and price-of-anarchy analysis of three models with increasing generality. In all models, we find that defenders have the incentive to over-protect targets, at times significantly. Additionally, in the simpler models, we find that the price of anarchy is unbounded, linearly increasing both in the number of defenders and the number of targets per defender. Considering interdependencies among targets, we develop a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation to compute a defender's best response, and make use of this formulation in approximating Nash equilibria of the game. We apply this approach towards computational strategic analysis of several models of networks representing interdependencies, including real-world power networks. Our analysis shows how network structure and the probability of failure spread determine the propensity of defenders to over- or under-invest in security.

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