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arXiv 2109.07429cs.CRcs.GT
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基于博弈论的链下协议安全性分析

Towards a Game-Theoretic Security Analysis of Off-Chain Protocols

Sophie Rain, Georgia Avarikioti, Laura Kovács, Matteo Maffei

摘要:

链下协议是解决区块链技术固有的可扩展性问题的最有前途的方法之一。其核心思想是让各方只在链上进行一次交易,以在它们之间建立一个通道,然后利用产生的通道路径在链下执行任意多个点对点交易。虽然在链下协议的证明技术方面已经取得了重大进展,但现有的方法并没有在其设计的核心中捕获博弈论激励,这导致忽视了过去的虫洞攻击等重要攻击向量。在这项工作中,我们通过引入第一个博弈论模型,对链下协议的原则性博弈论安全分析迈出了第一步,该模型具有足够的表达力来推理其安全性。我们提倡使用扩展形式博弈(EFG),并介绍了两个EFG实例来捕获闪电网络的关闭和路由的安全属性。具体来说,我们对关闭协议进行了建模,该协议依赖于惩罚机制来抑制各方在链上上传旧的通道状态。此外,我们建模的路由协议,从而正式表征虫洞攻击,一个漏洞,破坏了基于费用的激励机制的闪电网络。

英文摘要:

Off-chain protocols constitute one of the most promising approaches to solve the inherent scalability issue of blockchain technologies. The core idea is to let parties transact on-chain only once to establish a channel between them, leveraging later on the resulting channel paths to perform arbitrarily many peer-to-peer transactions off-chain. While significant progress has been made in terms of proof techniques for off-chain protocols, existing approaches do not capture the game-theoretic incentives at the core of their design, which led to overlooking significant attack vectors like the Wormhole attack in the past. In this work we take a first step towards a principled game-theoretic security analysis of off-chain protocols by introducing the first game-theoretic model that is expressive enough to reason about their security. We advocate the use of Extensive Form Games (EFGs) and introduce two instances of EFGs to capture security properties of the closing and the routing of the Lightning Network. Specifically, we model the closing protocol, which relies on punishment mechanisms to disincentivize parties to upload old channel states on-chain. Moreover, we model the routing protocol, thereby formally characterizing the Wormhole attack, a vulnerability that undermines the fee-based incentive mechanism underlying the Lightning Network.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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