捕手-逃避者游戏
Catcher-Evader Games
摘要：
计算博弈论解决方案的算法最近已被应用到一些安全领域。然而，许多技术开发的安全游戏的紧凑表示不扩展到{ \em贝叶斯}安全游戏，这使我们能够模拟攻击者的类型的不确定性。在本文中，我们介绍了一个一般的框架{ \em捕手逃避}游戏，可以捕获贝叶斯安全游戏以及其他游戏的兴趣。我们表明，计算Stackelberg策略是NP-难的，但给出了一个算法，计算的纳什均衡，在实验中表现良好。我们还证明了这些游戏的纳什均衡满足{ \em可扩展性}属性，所以均衡选择不是一个问题。
英文摘要：
Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to {\em Bayesian} security games, which allow us to model uncertainty about the attacker's type. In this paper, we introduce a general framework of {\em catcher-evader} games that can capture Bayesian security games as well as other game families of interest. We show that computing Stackelberg strategies is NP-hard, but give an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium that performs well in experiments. We also prove that the Nash equilibria of these games satisfy the {\em interchangeability} property, so that equilibrium selection is not an issue.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
