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arXiv 1701.08644cs.GTcs.CR
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具有非可加效用和多攻击者资源的安全博弈

Security Game with Non-additive Utilities and Multiple Attacker Resources

Sinong Wang, Ness Shroff

摘要:

人们对研究安全游戏有很大的兴趣,这些游戏用于对涉及关键基础设施、金融系统安全、政治活动和公民保障的各种系统上的攻击和防御的相互作用进行建模。然而,现有的安全博弈模型通常假设附加效用函数,或者攻击者只能攻击一个目标。这样的假设导致易于处理的分析,但错过了当前复杂网络中不同目标之间存在的关键固有依赖关系。在本文中,我们推广了经典的安全博弈模型,允许非可加的效用函数。我们还允许攻击者能够攻击多个目标。我们从理论的角度研究这样一个一般的安全博弈,并提供一个统一的观点。特别是,我们表明,每个安全游戏是等价于一个组合优化问题的集合系统$\varepsilon$,其中包括后卫的纯策略空间。我们使用的关键技术是基于变换,投影的多面体,和椭球方法。这项工作解决了安全博弈领域的几个开放性问题,并显着扩展了安全博弈的多项式可解类和NP难类的最新技术。

英文摘要:

There has been significant interest in studying security games for modeling the interplay of attacks and defenses on various systems involving critical infrastructure, financial system security, political campaigns, and civil safeguarding. However, existing security game models typically either assume additive utility functions, or that the attacker can attack only one target. Such assumptions lead to tractable analysis, but miss key inherent dependencies that exist among different targets in current complex networks. In this paper, we generalize the classical security game models to allow for non-additive utility functions. We also allow attackers to be able to attack multiple targets. We examine such a general security game from a theoretical perspective and provide a unified view. In particular, we show that each security game is equivalent to a combinatorial optimization problem over a set system $\varepsilon$, which consists of defender's pure strategy space. The key technique we use is based on the transformation, projection of a polytope, and the elipsoid method. This work settles several open questions in security game domain and significantly extends the state of-the-art of both the polynomial solvable and NP-hard class of the security game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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