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arXiv 2602.16071econ.THcs.GT
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网络博弈理论 第1部分:效用表示

A Theory of Network Games Part 1: Utility Representations

University of Chicago(芝加哥大学);Boston University(波士顿大学)

Joseph Root, Evan Sadler

AI总结:

本文探讨网络博弈中效用表示的可解释公理基础,提出双方面战略互动等价于玩家效用在对手间可加分离,并通过线性最佳反应和中点无差异条件确定经典线性二次效用。

摘要:

我们为网络博弈中使用的效用提供了可解释的公理基础,并识别了若干原则性推广。首先,我们证明网络博弈中普遍存在的双方面战略互动等价于玩家效用在对手间可加分离。常见基于对手动作线性汇总的效用在战略上等同于可加分离效用。假设实值动作,我们显示对手之间恒定的替代率意味着效用与对手动作线性相关。最后,我们确定了精确条件——线性最佳反应和中点无差异——以确定经典线性二次效用。

英文摘要:

We provide interpretable axiomatic foundations for utilities used in network games and identify several principled generalizations. First, we demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. Common utilities based on a linear aggregate of opponent actions are strategically equivalent to additively separable utilities. Moreover, assuming real-valued actions, we show that a constant rate of substitution between opponents implies a utility that is linear in opponent actions. Finally, we identify precise conditions--linear best replies and midpoint indifference--that pin down the classic linear-quadratic utility.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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