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arXiv 2201.09182econ.TH
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巩固边缘主义与平均主义:可转移效用博弈的新价值

Consolidating Marginalism and Egalitarianism: A New Value for Transferable Utility Games

D. Choudhury, S. Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi

摘要:

在具有可转移效用的合作博弈中,沙普利值是边际主义的极端情况,而平分规则是平均主义的极端情况。Shapley值并没有给非生产性参与者分配任何东西,平分规则也不关心参与者在产生资源时的相对效率。然而,在现实生活中,它们都不适合公平分配资源,因为社会既不缺乏团结,也不可能对奖励相对更具生产力的参与者漠不关心。因此,这两种极端情况之间的权衡引起了许多研究人员的注意。在本文中,我们得到了一个新的价值与可转移的效用合作博弈,一方面采取平均主义在较小的联盟,另一方面照顾到球员的边际生产力在足够大的联盟。我们的值在一个极端上与Shapley值相同,在另一个极端上与等分规则相同。我们提供了四个特征的值使用标准公理在文献中的变体。我们还建立了子博弈完美纳什均衡中我们价值的战略实施机制。

英文摘要:

In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive players and the Equal Division rule does not concern itself to the relative efficiency of the players in generating a resource. However, in real life situations neither of them is a good fit for the fair distribution of resources as the society is neither devoid of solidarity nor it can be indifferent to rewarding the relatively more productive players. Thus a trade-off between these two extreme cases has caught attention from many researchers. In this paper, we obtain a new value for cooperative games with transferable utilities that adopts egalitarianism in smaller coalitions on one hand and on the other hand takes care of the players' marginal productivity in sufficiently large coalitions. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We provide four characterizations of the value using variants of standard axioms in the literature. We have also developed a strategic implementation mechanism of our value in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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