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arXiv 2201.02793econ.TH
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网络游戏的组件平均Myerson值

The component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for Network Games

Surajit Borkotokey, Sujata Goala, Niharika Kakoty, Parishmita Boruah

摘要:

我们介绍了网络游戏的组件明智的平等主义迈尔森值。这个新的值是迈尔森值和分量式等分规则的凸组合,是基于玩家的分配规则。在合作框架下的网络游戏中,迈尔森值是边缘主义的极端例子,而平分规则则是平均主义的象征。在建议的组件明智的平等主义迈尔森值,凸性参数结合这两个属性,并确定团结的程度,以球员。在这里,我们所说的团结是指网络中参与者之间的相互支持或补偿。我们提供了价值的三个公理化特征。此外,我们提出了一个子博弈完美纳什均衡下的组件明智的平均迈尔森值的实现机制。

英文摘要:

We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under the cooperative framework, the Myerson value is an extreme example of marginalism, while the equal division rule signifies egalitarianism. In the proposed component-wise egalitarian Myerson value, a convexity parameter combines these two attributes and determines the degree of solidarity to the players. Here, by solidarity, we mean the mutual support or compensation among the players in a network. We provide three axiomatic characterizations of the value. Further, we propose an implementation mechanism for the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value under subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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