基于证据博弈的网络安全不完全欺骗量化模型
Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using Signaling Games with Evidence
摘要：
欺骗在通信和网络安全的许多交互中起着关键作用。被称为“廉价谈话信号游戏”的博弈论模型捕捉了欺骗性互动的动态和信息不对称性质。但信号游戏本质上是模仿不可察觉的欺骗。在本文中，我们研究了一个信号博弈模型，在该模型中，接收方可以检测到欺骗与一定的概率。该模型嵌套传统的信号博弈和完全信息Stackelberg博弈作为特例。我们提出了纯策略完美贝叶斯纳什均衡的游戏。然后，我们说明这些分析结果与应用程序的主动网络防御。证据的存在迫使大多数人采取诚实的行为，并消除了一些纯策略均衡。它总是有利于被欺骗的玩家，但令人惊讶的是，有时也有利于欺骗的玩家。
英文摘要：
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. In this paper, we investigate a model of signaling games in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability. This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. Then we illustrate these analytical results with an application to active network defense. The presence of evidence forces majority-truthful behavior and eliminates some pure strategy equilibria. It always benefits the deceived player, but surprisingly sometimes also benefits the deceiving player.
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