两种机制的故事：激励安全游戏的投资
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Incentivizing Investments in Security Games
摘要：
在相互依赖的用户系统中，实体的安全不仅受到该用户在安全措施方面的投资的影响，而且还受到其他用户（一些）安全决策的正外部性的影响。因此，在这样的系统中的安全性的提供被建模为公共物品提供问题，并被称为安全博弈。在本文中，我们比较了两个著名的激励机制，在这种情况下，激励用户之间的最佳安全投资，即利润和外部性机制。税收机制中的税收旨在确保用户的自愿参与，而外部性机制中的税收旨在维持预算平衡。我们首先展示了更普遍的结果，即由于安全的非排他性，没有机制可以激励社会最优的投资组合，同时确保自愿参与，并保持平衡的预算的所有实例的安全游戏。为了进一步说明，我们应用的加权总努力相互依赖模型的特殊情况下，和识别一些不同的用户之间的相互依赖的影响，在预算赤字的加权机制，以及参与激励的外部性机制。
英文摘要：
In a system of interdependent users, the security of an entity is affected not only by that user's investment in security measures, but also by the positive externality of the security decisions of (some of) the other users. The provision of security in such system is therefore modeled as a public good provision problem, and is referred to as a security game. In this paper, we compare two well-known incentive mechanisms in this context for incentivizing optimal security investments among users, namely the Pivotal and the Externality mechanisms. The taxes in a Pivotal mechanism are designed to ensure users' voluntary participation, while those in an Externality mechanism are devised to maintain a balanced budget. We first show the more general result that, due to the non-excludable nature of security, no mechanism can incentivize the socially optimal investment profile, while at the same time ensuring voluntary participation and maintaining a balanced budget for all instances of security games. To further illustrate, we apply the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms to the special case of weighted total effort interdependence models, and identify some of the effects of varying interdependency between users on the budget deficit in the Pivotal mechanism, as well as on the participation incentives in the Externality mechanism.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
