Reinforcement learning has shown much success in games such as chess, backgammon and Go. However, in most of these games, agents have full knowledge of the environment at all times. In this paper, we describe a deep learning model in which agents successfully adapt to different classes of opponents and learn the optimal counter-strategy using reinforcement learning in a game under partial observability. We apply our model to FlipIt, a two-player security game in which both players, the attacker and the defender, compete for ownership of a shared resource and only receive information on the current state of the game upon making a move. Our model is a deep neural network combined with Q-learning and is trained to maximize the defender's time of ownership of the resource. Despite the noisy information, our model successfully learns a cost-effective counter-strategy outperforming its opponent's strategies and shows the advantages of the use of deep reinforcement learning in game theoretic scenarios. We also extend FlipIt to a larger action-spaced game with the introduction of a new lower-cost move and generalize the model to $n$-player FlipIt.
Khoury College of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University（东北大学库里计算机科学学院）
A rise in Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) has introduced a need for robustness against long-running, stealthy attacks which circumvent existing cryptographic security guarantees. FlipIt is a security game that models attacker-defender interactions in advanced scenarios such as APTs. Previous work analyzed extensively non-adaptive strategies in FlipIt, but adaptive strategies rise naturally in practical interactions as players receive feedback during the game. We model the FlipIt game as a Markov Decision Process and introduce QFlip, an adaptive strategy for FlipIt based on temporal differen…
Tulane University（杜兰大学）；The Ohio State University（俄亥俄州立大学）；University of California, Davis（加利福尼亚大学戴维斯分校）
Cybersecurity is increasingly threatened by advanced and persistent attacks. As these attacks are often designed to disable a system (or a critical resource, e.g., a user account) repeatedly, it is crucial for the defender to keep updating its security measures to strike a balance between the risk of being compromised and the cost of security updates. Moreover, these decisions often need to be made with limited and delayed feedback due to the stealthy nature of advanced attacks. In addition to targeted attacks, such an optimal timing policy under incomplete information has broad applications i…
University of Maryland（马里兰大学）；Montgomery Blair High School（蒙哥马利布莱尔高中）；Wootton High School（伍顿高中）
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms have been successfully applied to real world situations like illegal smuggling, poaching, deforestation, climate change, airport security, etc. These scenarios can be framed as Stackelberg security games (SSGs) where defenders and attackers compete to control target resources. The algorithm's competency is assessed by which agent is controlling the targets. This review investigates modeling of SSGs in RL with a focus on possible improvements of target representations in RL algorithms.
Green Security Games with real-time information (GSG-I) add the real-time information about the agents' movement to the typical GSG formulation. Prior works on GSG-I have used deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to learn the best policy for the agent in such an environment without any need to store the huge number of state representations for GSG-I. However, the decision-making process of DRL methods is largely opaque, which results in a lack of trust in their predictions. To tackle this issue, we present an interpretable DRL method for GSG-I that generates visualization to explain the decisions…
Peking University（北京大学）；Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）；Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；World Wild Fund for Nature（世界自然基金会）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）
Green Security Games (GSGs) have been proposed and applied to optimize patrols conducted by law enforcement agencies in green security domains such as combating poaching, illegal logging and overfishing. However, real-time information such as footprints and agents' subsequent actions upon receiving the information, e.g., rangers following the footprints to chase the poacher, have been neglected in previous work. To fill the gap, we first propose a new game model GSG-I which augments GSGs with sequential movement and the vital element of real-time information. Second, we design a novel deep rei…
How resources are deployed to secure critical targets in networks can be modelled by Network Security Games (NSGs). While recent advances in deep learning (DL) provide a powerful approach to dealing with large-scale NSGs, DL methods such as NSG-NFSP suffer from the problem of data inefficiency. Furthermore, due to centralized control, they cannot scale to scenarios with a large number of resources. In this paper, we propose a novel DL-based method, NSGZero, to learn a non-exploitable policy in NSGs. NSGZero improves data efficiency by performing planning with neural Monte Carlo Tree Search (MC…
KTH Royal Institute of Technology（瑞典皇家理工学院）；KTH Center for Cyber Defense and Information Security（KTH网络防御与信息安全中心）
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play. The game-theoretic perspective allows us to find defender strategies that are effective against dynamic attackers. The optimal stopping formulation gives us insight into the structure of optimal strategies, which we show to have threshold properties. To obtain the optimal defender strategies, we introduce T-FP, a fict…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective best interests, the follower's strategy is to play the best response to the leader's strategy. In such a scenario, the leader has the advantage of committing to a policy which maximizes its own returns given the knowledge that the follower is going to play the best response to its policy. Thus, both players converge to a pair of policies that form the Stackel…
Harvard（哈佛大学）；University of Southern California（南加州大学）
Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an adversary's response to defense on a limited set of targets, we study the problem of learning a defense that generalizes well to a new set of targets with novel feature values and combinations. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed via a two-stage approach where an adversary model is trained to maximize predictive accuracy without considering the defender's …
The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on papers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern California, which deepened different directions in this field. After a brief introduction on Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) and the poaching setting, the rest of the work presents how to model a boundedly rational attacker taking into account her human behavior, then describes how to face the problem of having attacker's payoffs not defined and how to estimate them and, finally, pres…
Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data about defender-adversary interactions. Given these recent developments, this paper commits to an approach of directly learning the response function of the adversary. Using the PAC model, this paper lays a firm theoretical foundation for learning in SSGs (e.g., theoretically answer questions about the numbers of samples required to learn adversary behavior) and provides utility guarantees when the learned …
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to understand an attacker's motivation and their likely next best action. As a first step in modeling this behavior, we introduce a security game framework that simulates interplay between attackers and defenders in a noisy environment, focusing on the factors that drive decision making for attackers and defenders in the variants of the game with full knowledge and ob…
Securing networked infrastructures is important in the real world. The problem of deploying security resources to protect against an attacker in networked domains can be modeled as Network Security Games (NSGs). Unfortunately, existing approaches, including the deep learning-based approaches, are inefficient to solve large-scale extensive-form NSGs. In this paper, we propose a novel learning paradigm, NSG-NFSP, to solve large-scale extensive-form NSGs based on Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP). Our main contributions include: i) reforming the best response (BR) policy network in NFSP to be a …
Distributed machine learning algorithms play a significant role in processing massive data sets over large networks. However, the increasing reliance on machine learning on information and communication technologies (ICTs) makes it inherently vulnerable to cyber threats. This work aims to develop secure distributed algorithms to protect the learning from data poisoning and network attacks. We establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the conflicting goals of a learner who uses distributed support vector machines (SVMs) and an attacker who is capable of modifying training data and labels.…
Advances in machine learning have led to broad deployment of systems with impressive performance on important problems. Nonetheless, these systems can be induced to make errors on data that are surprisingly similar to examples the learned system handles correctly. The existence of these errors raises a variety of questions about out-of-sample generalization and whether bad actors might use such examples to abuse deployed systems. As a result of these security concerns, there has been a flurry of recent papers proposing algorithms to defend against such malicious perturbations of correctly hand…
