随机Stackelberg非对称证券博弈的零决定策略
Zero-Determinant Strategy in Stochastic Stackelberg Asymmetric Security Game
摘要：
在随机Stackelberg非对称安全博弈中，强Stackelberg均衡（SSE）策略是防御者利用最佳对策（BR）策略对抗攻击者时获得最高效用的常用策略。然而，攻击者可能是一个有限理性的参与者，他采用BR策略和固定顽固策略的组合。在这种情况下，由于存在顽固因素，上证策略可能无法维持防御性业绩。在本文中，我们关注的是如何防御者可以采取单边控制零确定（ZD）策略来对抗有限理性攻击者。首先，我们证明了防御者的ZD策略的存在性。然后，我们研究了防御者的ZD策略对有限理性攻击者的性能，并与SSE策略进行了比较。具体来说，当攻击者的策略接近BR策略时，ZD策略与SSE策略相比允许防御者有界损失。相反，当攻击者的策略接近顽固策略时，ZD策略比SSE策略能为防御者带来更高的防御性能。
英文摘要：
In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubborn element. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt the unilateral-control zero-determinate (ZD) strategy to confront the boundedly rational attacker. At first, we verify the existence of ZD strategies for the defender. We then investigate the performance of the defender's ZD strategy against a boundedly rational attacker, with a comparison of the SSE strategy. Specifically, when the attacker's strategy is close to the BR strategy, the ZD strategy admits a bounded loss for the defender compared with the SSE strategy. Conversely, when the attacker's strategy is close to the stubborn strategy, the ZD strategy can bring higher defensive performance for the defender than the SSE strategy does.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
