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arXiv 2505.03391cs.GT
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具有候选位置和有限资源的真实设施选址问题

Truthful Facility Location with Candidate Locations and Limited Resources

Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris

AI总结:

本文研究候选位置和有限资源下的真实设施选址问题,提出近似比为k的随机机制和近似比约2.325的确定性机制,并给出相应下界。

摘要:

我们研究一个真实设施选址问题,其中必须从区间 $[0,1]$ 内的一组候选位置中选出一个位置来建设 $k\geq2$ 个可用设施中的一个。该决策旨在容纳一组在 $[0,1]$ 中具有私有位置且对设施具有批准偏好的智能体;智能体采取策略性行为,可能虚报其私有信息以最大化其效用,该效用取决于所选设施及其与该设施的距离。我们关注策略证明机制,这些机制激励智能体真实报告,并界定它们所能达到的最优社会福利(智能体的总效用)的最佳可能近似。我们首先证明确定性机制具有无界的近似比,然后提出一个近似比为 $k$ 的随机机制,即使智能体只能虚报其位置,该近似比也是紧的。对于智能体只能虚报其批准偏好的受限设置,我们设计了一个近似比约为 $2.325$ 的确定性机制,并分别建立了确定性机制和随机机制的下界 $3/2$ 和 $6/5$。

英文摘要:

We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with private positions in $[0,1]$ and approval preferences over the facilities; the agents act strategically and may misreport their private information to maximize their utility, which depends on the chosen facility and their distance from it. We focus on strategyproof mechanisms that incentivize the agents to act truthfully and bound the best possible approximation of the optimal social welfare (the total utility of the agents) they can achieve. We first show that deterministic mechanisms have unbounded approximation ratio, and then present a randomized mechanism with approximation ratio $k$, which is tight even when agents may only misreport their positions. For the restricted setting where agents may only misreport their approval preferences, we design a deterministic mechanism with approximation ratio of roughly $2.325$, and establish lower bounds of $3/2$ and $6/5$ for deterministic and randomized mechanisms, respectively.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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