With the development of artificial intelligence, human beings are increasingly interested in human-agent collaboration, which generates a series of problems about the relationship between agents and humans, such as trust and cooperation. This inevitably induces the inherent human characteristic that there are subjective interaction preferences for different groups, especially in human-agent hybrid systems where human-human interaction, agent-agent interaction, and human-agent interaction coexist. However, understanding how individual interaction preferences affect the cooperation of the system remains a major challenge. Therefore, this paper proposes a human-agent hybrid prisoner's dilemma game system under the framework of evolutionary game. In spatial networks, the most significant difference between agents and humans is the flexibility of decision, where humans have higher adaptive capabilities, follow link dynamics, and adopt free decision rules, which enable them to choose different strategies for different neighbors. However, agents follow node dynamics and adopt consistent decision rules, applying the same strategy to different neighbors. We give the subjective preferences of any individual to different groups, involving the interaction preferences between homogeneous groups and heterogeneous groups respectively. The simulation results show that both human and agent have asymmetric interaction preferences for groups with different identities, which can significantly improve the cooperative behavior of the system. In the hybrid system, human groups show more stable prosocial behavior. Agent groups can form highly cooperative clusters under the condition of strong interaction preference for human groups. In addition, giving agents the ability to identify opponents can effectively alleviate the interaction dilemma of agents.
Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma (PD) is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than social preferences for equity or efficiency. By contrast, little is known on what motivates cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG). Cooperation in the SHG fundamentally differs from cooperation in the PD in that it is not costly, but risky: players have no temptation to deviate from the cooperative outcome, but cooperation only pays off if the other player cooperates. Here, we provide data from a large (N=436), pre-registered, experime…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as microbial cooperation and crowdsourcing collaborations. Here, we study coevolutionary public goods games where strategies coevolve with the multiplication factors of group cooperation. Asymmetry can arise in such environmental feedback, where games organized by focal cooperators may have a different efficiency than the ones by defectors. Our analysis shows …
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game). We examine the distribution of cooperation amounts, and how that distribution varies based on the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (b/c). Interestingly, we find a trimodal distribution at all b/c values investigated. Increasing b/c decreases the fraction of participants engaging in zero cooperation …
Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However mutual aid is made difficult by the problems of coordinating diverse norms and preferences, and communication is harried by substantial ambiguity in meaning. Here we demonstrate that these two facts can work together to allow cooperation to develop, by the strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals, covert signaling. Covert signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but obscured when perceived by others. Such signals may allow coordination and…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma, and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions enable reciprocity. Analysis of this phenomenon typically assumes bi-directional social interactions, even though real-world interactions are often uni-directional. Uni-directional interactions -- where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely -- arise in real-world populations as the result of …
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked social interactions, other-regarding preferences considering the payoffs of others, reciprocity rules to establish cooperation as a social norm, and multilevel selection involving simultaneous competition between individuals favoring cheaters and competition between groups favoring cooperators. In this paper, we build on recent work studying PDE replicator equ…
Social networks have a scale-free property and community structure, and many problems in life have the characteristic of public goods, such as resource shortage. Due to different preferences of individuals, there exist individuals who adopt heterogeneous strategies updating rules in the network. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free community network with public goods games and the influence of multiple strategy updating rules. Here, two types of strategy updating rules are considered which are pairwise comparison rules and aspiration-driven rules. Numerical simulations…
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between…
The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they can…
Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems. Previous studies revealed that a preference toward similar appearance promotes cooperation, a phenomenon called tag-mediated cooperation or communitarian cooperation. This effect is enhanced when a spatial structure is incorporated, because space allows agents sharing an identical tag to regroup to form locally cooperative clusters. In spatially distributed settings, one can also consider migration of organisms, which has a potential to further promote evolution of cooperation by facilitating spatial clustering. However, it has not ye…
Symmetric preferences, asymmetric outcomes: Tipping dynamics in an open-city segregation model
Institut de Física d’Altes Energies (IFAE)（高等物理能源研究所）；The Barcelona Institute of Science and Technology (BIST)（巴塞罗那科学与技术研究院）；University of Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹大学）；Dutch Institute for Emergent Phenomena, University of Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹大学荷兰涌现现象研究所）；Complexity Science Hub Vienna（维也纳复杂科学中心）；Dutch Institute for Emergent Phenomena（荷兰涌现现象研究所）；Department of Mathematics, VU Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹自由大学数学系）；Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek（荷兰中央统计局）
Cooperation in Public Goods Games over Uniform Random Hypergraphs with Game Transitions
College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University（西南大学人工智能学院）；Business College, Southwest University（西南大学商学院）；Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research（能源研究中心技术物理与材料科学研究所）
Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is network reciprocity, where the interaction patterns and opportunities for strategy spread of agents are constrained to limited sets of permanent interactions partners. Cooperation survives because it is possible for close-knit communities of cooperation to be shielded from invasion by defectors. Here we show that parameter ranges in which cooperation can survive …
A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the spreading and disappearance of strategies. In this paper, it is shown that success-driven motion can trigger such local agglomeration and may, therefore, be used to supplement other mechanisms supporting cooperation, like reputation or punishment. Success-driven motion is formulated here as a function of the game-theoretical payoffs. It can change the outcome an…
Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-…
In this paper, we investigate the prison's dilemma game with monte carlo rule in the view of the idea of the classic Monte Carlo method on the grid. Monte carlo rule is an organic combination of the current dynamic rules of individual policy adjustment, which not only makes full use of information but also reflects the individual's bounded rational behavior and the ambivalence between the pursuit of high returns and high risks. In addition, it also reflects the individual's behavioral execution preferences. The implementation of monte carlo rule brings an extremely good result, higher cooperat…
In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between players are little explored. In a recent study, Press and Dyson demonstrate that if only one player can learn about the other, asymmetric exploitation is achieved in the prisoner's dilemma game. In contrast, however, it is unknown whether such one-way exploitation is stably established when both players learn about each other symmetrically and try to optimize the…
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. Thi…
In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players could be more sophisticated because not all players are attractive enough for others to participate in a joint venture. What if only those players can initiate a group formation and establish a game who are successful enough to the neighbors? To elaborate this idea we employ a modified protocol and demonstrate that a carefully chosen threshold to establish …
We report our recent simulations on the social processes which -- in our opinion -- lie at the bottom of hate. First simulation deals with the so-called Heider balance where initial purely random preferences split the community into two mutually hostile groups. Second simulation shows that once these groups are formed, the cooperation between them is going to fail. Third simulation provides a numerical illustration of the process of biased learning; the model indicates that lack of objective information is a barrier to new information. Fourth simulation shows that in the presence of a strong c…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social institutions, affects the evolution of cooperation is still unclear. We propose a model where individuals with heterogeneous social ties might well engage in differing numbers of Public Goods Games, yet with each Public Goods Game being constant size during the course of evolution. To do this, we assume that each focal individual unidirectionally selects a constant num…
The similarities between phase separation in physics and residential segregation by preference in the Schelling model of 1971 are reviewed. Also, new computer simulations of asymmetric interactions different from the usual Ising model are presented, showing spontaneous magnetisation (= self-organising segregation) and in one case a sharp phase transition.
We study the evolution of two mutually interacting games with both pairwise games as well as the public goods game on different topologies. On 2d square lattices, we reveal that the game-game interaction can promote the cooperation prevalence in all cases, and the cooperation-defection phase transitions even become absent and fairly high cooperation is expected when the interaction goes to be very strong. A mean-field theory is developed that points out new dynamical routes arising therein. Detailed analysis shows indeed that there are rich categories of interactions in either individual or bu…
Sustaining cooperation among self-interested agents is critical for the proliferation of emerging online social communities, such as online communities formed through social networking services. Providing incentives for cooperation in social communities is particularly challenging because of their unique features: a large population of anonymous agents interacting infrequently, having asymmetric interests, and dynamically joining and leaving the community; operation errors; and low-cost reputation whitewashing. In this paper, taking these features into consideration, we propose a framework for…
Interactions between COVID-19 and other pathogens may change their dynamics. Specifically, this may hinder the modelling of empirical data when the symptoms of both infections are hard to distinguish. We introduce a model coupling the dynamics of COVID-19 and seasonal influenza, simulating cooperation, competition and asymmetric interactions. We find that the coupling synchronizes both infections, with a strong influence on the dynamics of influenza, reducing its time extent to a half.
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and Q. These models are stud…
We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we introduce a framework based on evolutionary games where individuals have the capacity to perceive their interactions in different ways. Starting from the narrative of social behaviors in a pub as an illustration, we first study the combination of the prisoner's dilemma and harmony game as two alternative perceptions of the same situation. Considering a selecti…
Contact, conflict, or opportunity? Out-group exposure creates tie opportunity, not tolerance
Complexity Science Hub（复杂科学中心）；Graz University of Technology（格拉茨工业大学）；Masaryk University（马萨里克大学）；National Institute SYRI（SYRI国家研究所）；Universidad Politécnica de Madrid（马德里理工大学）
We propose an extended public goods interaction model to study the evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous population. The investors are arranged on the well known scale-free type network, the Barabási-Albert model. Each investor is supposed to preferentially distribute capital to pools in its portfolio based on the knowledge of pool sizes. The extent that investors prefer larger pools is determined by investment strategy denoted by a tunable parameter $α$, with larger $α$ corresponding to more preference to larger pools. As comparison, we also study this interaction model on square lattice,…
