Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot Stag-Hunt Game

环境反馈下的合作动力学：稳态与转变

Cooperation Dynamics with Environmental Feedback: Steady States and Transitions

本文针对四类经典博弈构建策略-收益环境反馈模型，推导得等价复制子方程，揭示初始合作水平、背叛诱惑与惩罚对合作的调控机制，为理解集体亲社会行为提供基础。

Opportunistic Migration in Spatial Evolutionary Games

We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the best rule for strategy revision, it is shown that cooperation may evolve and be stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game space for several migration distances but only for small game interaction radius while the Stag Hunt class of games become fully cooperative. We also show that only a few trials are needed for cooperation to evolve, i.e. searching costs are not an issue.…

成对社会困境博弈的稳定性：破坏性智能体、建设性智能体及其联合效应

Stability of pairwise social dilemma games: destructive agents, constructive agents, and their joint effects

本研究在无限充分混合种群中用复制动力学分析成对社会困境博弈，发现破坏性智能体无法促进合作反而破坏均衡，建设性智能体的效应随收益变化，二者组合会产生多稳态复杂演化动态，深化了对自愿参与机制影响合作的理解。

Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society

Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents' strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the self-organization of the social network, a result that is non-trivi…

Evolutionary Games on Networks and Payoff Invariance Under Replicator Dynamics

The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally and by numerical simulation, that it leaves the replicator dynamics invariant with respect to affine transformations of the game payoff matrix. We then show empirically that, using the modified payoff scheme, an interesting amount of cooperation can be reached in three paradigmatic non-cooperative two-person games in populations that are structured according…

Evolutionary games with facilitators: When does selection favor cooperation?

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that support cooperation by enhancing the reproductive potential of cooperators relative to the fitness of defectors. By computing the fixation probability of a single cooperator in finite and well-mixed populations that include a fixed number of facilitators, and by using mean field analysis, we determine when selection promotes cooperation in the important classes …

Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and Q. These models are stud…

通过自主智能体促进人-智能体混合群体中的合作

Facilitating Cooperation in Human-Agent Hybrid Populations through Autonomous Agents

该研究在演化博弈论框架下探究合作型与背叛型自主智能体（AAs）对人-智能体混合群体合作的影响，发现不同博弈场景下AAs作用存在差异，合理设计应用可最大化其促合作效果。

Truncation selection and diffusion on lattices

Evolutionary games on graphs have been extensively studied. A variety of graph structures, graph dynamics, and behaviours of replicators have been explored. These models have primarily been studied in the framework of facilitation of cooperation, and much previous research has shed light on this field of study. However, there has been little attention devoted to truncation selection as most models employ proportional selection (such as in the replicator equation) or `imitate the best.' Here we systematically explore truncation selection on periodic square lattices, where replicators below a fi…

Weakest-link control of invasive species: Impacts of memory, bounded rationality and network structure in repeated cooperative games

The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and pathogens in agricultural and forestry makes it necessary to consider how the actions of one manager affect neighbouring properties. In addition to the direct effects of a potential spread of a pest and the resulting economic loss, there are also indirect consequences that affect whole regions and that require coordinated actions to manage and/or to eradicate it (like movement restrictions). In this paper we address the emergence and stability of cooperation among agents who respond to a threat of an invasive pest or disease. The model, based …