入侵物种的最弱环节控制：记忆、有限理性和网络结构对重复合作博弈的影响
Weakest-link control of invasive species: Impacts of memory, bounded rationality and network structure in repeated cooperative games
摘要：
许多入侵性害虫和病原体在农业和林业中的扩散性质使得有必要考虑一个管理者的行动如何影响邻近的财产。除了有害生物可能扩散的直接影响和由此造成的经济损失外，还有影响整个地区的间接后果，需要采取协调行动来管理和/或根除（如行动限制）。在本文中，我们解决的出现和稳定的代理人之间的合作谁应对入侵性害虫或疾病的威胁。该模型基于最弱环节范式，使用重复的多参与者协调博弈，其中参与者的收益取决于管理决策，以防止入侵自己的土地以及网络上的邻居。我们发现，对于基本的合作博弈代理选择的风险主导策略的雄鹿狩猎游戏的支付优势策略的实施控制措施。然而，合作可以通过社会规划者提供生物安全付款来实现。这种支付的临界水平取决于决策过程的细节，更高的信任（基于其他代理人反映其过去表现的声誉）允许显着减少必要的支付，并在支付较低时减缓合作衰退。我们还发现，允许在决策过程中的不确定性，可以加强合作的低水平的支付。最后，我们显示了产业结构的重要性，以合作的出现，与网络节点的平均协调数的增加，导致增加的关键生物安全支付。
英文摘要：
The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and pathogens in agricultural and forestry makes it necessary to consider how the actions of one manager affect neighbouring properties. In addition to the direct effects of a potential spread of a pest and the resulting economic loss, there are also indirect consequences that affect whole regions and that require coordinated actions to manage and/or to eradicate it (like movement restrictions). In this paper we address the emergence and stability of cooperation among agents who respond to a threat of an invasive pest or disease. The model, based on the weakest-link paradigm, uses repeated multi-participant coordination games where players' pay-offs depend on management decisions to prevent the invasion on their own land as well as of their neighbours on a network. We show that for the basic cooperation game agents select the risk-dominant strategy of a Stag hunt game over the pay-off dominant strategy of implementing control measures. However, cooperation can be achieved by the social planner offering a biosecurity payment. The critical level of this payment depends on the details of the decision-making process, with higher trust (based on a reputation of other agents reflecting their past performance) allowing a significant reduction in necessary payments and slowing down decay in cooperation when the payment is low. We also find that allowing for uncertainty in decision-making process can enhance cooperation for low levels of payments. Finally, we show the importance of industry structure to the emergence of cooperation, with increase in the average coordination number of network nodes leading to increase in the critical biosecurity payment.
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