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arXiv 1104.4532cs.GTphysics.bio-phphysics.soc-phq-bio.PE
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与适者竞争：一个促进合作出现的简单策略

Playing against the fittest: A simple strategy that promotes the emergence of cooperation

M. Brede

备注：
6 pages, 5 figures, in press
发表信息：
Europhysics Letters, 2011
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摘要：

理解合作的出现和持续性是进化生物学的一个基本问题，经常在进化博弈论的框架下进行研究。一个非常强大的机制，以促进合作是网络互惠，互动模式和机会的战略传播的代理人被限制到有限的永久互动伙伴。合作之所以存在，是因为紧密合作的社区有可能免受叛逃者的入侵。在这里，我们表明，参数范围内，合作可以生存的强烈扩大，如果网络上的游戏是偏向于更频繁的互动与更成功的邻居。特别是，如果代理专门选择邻居比自己更成功的游戏，合作甚至可以占主导地位的情况下，它会消亡，如果互动邻居选择没有偏见或偏好不太成功的对手。我们证明了“选择更合适的邻居”策略是进化稳定的。此外，它将成为一个最初随机的代理人群体的主导策略。

英文摘要：

Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is network reciprocity, where the interaction patterns and opportunities for strategy spread of agents are constrained to limited sets of permanent interactions partners. Cooperation survives because it is possible for close-knit communities of cooperation to be shielded from invasion by defectors. Here we show that parameter ranges in which cooperation can survive are strongly expanded if game play on networks is skewed towards more frequent interactions with more successful neighbours. In particular, if agents exclusively select neighbors for game play that are more successful than themselves, cooperation can even dominate in situations in which it would die out if interaction neighbours were chosen without a bias or with a preference for less successful opponents. We demonstrate that the "selecting fitter neighbours" strategy is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, it will emerge as the dominant strategy out of an initially random population of agents.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。

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