Social networks have a scale-free property and community structure, and many problems in life have the characteristic of public goods, such as resource shortage. Due to different preferences of individuals, there exist individuals who adopt heterogeneous strategies updating rules in the network. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in the scale-free community network with public goods games and the influence of multiple strategy updating rules. Here, two types of strategy updating rules are considered which are pairwise comparison rules and aspiration-driven rules. Numerical simulations are conducted and presented corresponding results. We find that community structure promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. In the meantime, there is a "U" shape relationship between the frequency of cooperators and the proportion of the two strategy updating rules. With the variance in the proportion of the two strategy updating rules, pairwise comparison rules seem to be more sensitive. Compared with aspiration-driven rules, pairwise comparison rules play a more important role in promoting cooperation. Our work may be helpful to understand the evolution of cooperation in social networks.
Understanding the role of network structure in the evolution of cooperation is a key research goal at the intersection between physics and biology. Recent studies have particularly focused on multiplex networks given that multiple social domains are interrelated and cannot be represented by single-layer networks. However, the role of network multiplexity is not fully understood when combined with another important network characteristic: network dynamics. In the present study, we investigated evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games played on dynamic two-layer multiplex networks in which the payo…
Cost of time passing plays an important role when investigate the collective behaviour in real world. Each rational individual can get a more reasonable strategy by comprehensively considering the time cost. Motivated by the fact, we here propose a mechanism with individual time cost heterogeneity whose core lies in two aspects: 1. The individuals in the rule network are divided into 2 groups: high-time cost and low-time cost. 2. Each individual is endowed with a time cost parameter, and the individuals take into account the effect of time cost on the benefit when they interact with a neighbou…
The success of modern civilization is built upon widespread cooperation in human society, deciphering the mechanisms behind has being a major goal for centuries. A crucial fact is, however, largely missing in most prior studies that games in the real world are typically played simultaneously and interactively rather than separately as assumed. Here we introduce the idea of interacting games that different games coevolve and influence each other's decision-making. We show that as the game-game interaction becomes important, the cooperation phase transition dramatically improves, a fairly high l…
We study the evolution of two mutually interacting games with both pairwise games as well as the public goods game on different topologies. On 2d square lattices, we reveal that the game-game interaction can promote the cooperation prevalence in all cases, and the cooperation-defection phase transitions even become absent and fairly high cooperation is expected when the interaction goes to be very strong. A mean-field theory is developed that points out new dynamical routes arising therein. Detailed analysis shows indeed that there are rich categories of interactions in either individual or bu…
The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention on the impact of social networks and their dynamics in promoting or hindering cooperation, drawing various context-dependent conclusions. For example, some lines of research, theoretical and experimental, suggest the existence of a threshold effect in the ratio of timescales of network evolution, after which cooperation will emerge, whereas other lines dispute this…
Post-Disaster Resource Redistribution and Cooperation Evolution Based on Two-Layer Network Evolutionary Games
Northwestern Polytechnical University（西北工业大学）；Shaanxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Game Theory and Information Processing at Higher Education Institutions（陕西省高校智能博弈与信息处理重点实验室）；Nanjing University of Science and Technology（南京理工大学）
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity preservation. An important, and so far overlooked, aspect of reality is the diverse strategic identities of individuals. While applying the same strategy to all interaction partners may be an acceptable assumption for simpler forms of life, this fails to account} for the behavior of more complex living beings. For instance, we humans act differently around different peo…
Due to limited cognitive skills for perceptual error or other emotional reasons, players may keep their current strategies even if there is a more promising choice. Such behavior inertia has already been studied, but its consequences remained unexplored in the weak selection limit. To fill this gap, we consider a spatial public goods game model where inertia is considered during the imitation process. By using the identity-by-descent method, we present analytical forms of the critical synergy factor $r^\star$, which determines when cooperation is favored. We find that inertia hinders cooperati…
