arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2402.11209cs.GTcs.CCecon.THmath.OC
收藏

安全博弈中简单策略接近最优的情形

When Simple is Near Optimal in Security Games

Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky, Marco Pavone

AI总结:

该研究将欺诈治理建模为管理员与用户的安全博弈,证明最优策略计算为NP难,提出贪心算法达最优解一半性能且有资源扩增保证,同质用户下有更高效算法,经停车执法案例验证可显著增收,并拓展了模型适用场景。

摘要:

欺诈在各类应用中无处不在,涉及用户规避法律规则,通常带有获取某种合法行为范围内无法得到的利益的策略性目的。然而,用户欺诈可能造成严重危害。\n 为减轻用户欺诈的危害,我们将欺诈治理问题建模为管理员与用户之间的安全博弈展开研究。在该博弈中,管理员在$L$个地点部署$R$份安全资源(如警务人员),并对在这些地点实施欺诈的用户处以罚款。针对该安全博弈,我们研究了管理员的收益最大化和收入最大化两类目标。在两种设定下,我们均证明计算管理员的最优策略是NP难问题,并针对各自场景设计了自然的贪心算法变体,其实现的收益或收入分别不低于收益最大化或收入最大化最优解的一半。我们还建立了资源扩增保证:我们提出的贪心算法在多一份资源(即$R+1$份资源)的情况下,实现的收益(收入)至少与使用$R$份资源的收益最大化(收入最大化)结果相当。此外,在用户类型同质的设定下,我们为收入最大化问题设计了近线性时间算法,为收益最大化问题设计了多项式时间近似方案。\n 接下来,我们基于斯坦福大学校园停车执法的案例研究开展了数值实验,结果凸显了我们算法的有效性:该校停车许可证年收入可增加30万美元以上。最后,我们研究了若干模型扩展方向,包括引入合约以缩小收益最大化结果与收入最大化结果之间的差距,以及将我们的模型推广至纳入资源预算约束之外的其他约束条件。

英文摘要:

Fraud is ubiquitous across applications and involve users bypassing the rule of law, often with the strategic aim of obtaining some benefit that would otherwise be unattainable within the bounds of lawful conduct. However, user fraud can be detrimental. To mitigate the harms of user fraud, we study the problem of policing fraud as a security game between an administrator and users. In this game, an administrator deploys $R$ security resources (e.g., police officers) across $L$ locations and levies fines against users engaging in fraud at those locations. For this security game, we study both payoff and revenue maximization administrator objectives. In both settings, we show that computing the optimal administrator strategy is NP-hard and develop natural greedy algorithm variants for the respective settings that achieve at least half the payoff or revenue as the payoff-maximizing or revenue-maximizing solutions, respectively. We also establish a resource augmentation guarantee that our proposed greedy algorithms with one extra resource, i.e., $R+1$ resources, achieve at least the same payoff (revenue) as the payoff-maximizing (revenue-maximizing) outcome with $R$ resources. Moreover, in the setting when user types are homogeneous, we develop a near-linear time algorithm for the revenue maximization problem and a polynomial time approximation scheme for the payoff maximization problem. Next, we present numerical experiments based on a case study of parking enforcement at Stanford University's campus, highlighting the efficacy of our algorithms in increasing parking permit earnings at the university by over \$300,000 annually. Finally, we study several model extensions, including incorporating contracts to bridge the gap between the payoff and revenue-maximizing outcomes and generalizing our model to incorporate additional constraints beyond a resource budget constraint.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑