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arXiv 2302.08702math.OCmath.FA
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具有无序偏好的广义Nash均衡问题的变分重构

Variational Reformulation of Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Non-ordered Preferences

Asrifa Sultana, Shivani Valecha

摘要:

非合作对策中的局中人的偏好表示他们在可用选项集中的选择,如果局中人能够比较任何一对可用选项,则满足完备性。在现有文献中,广义Nash博弈的变分重构依赖于参与人偏好的数值表示为目标函数,这只有在偏好是传递的和完全的情况下才是可能的。在这项工作中,我们首先刻画了联合凸广义纳什均衡问题的变分不等式,而不需要任何数值表示的偏好。进一步,我们给出了非序(不完全和非传递)非凸相互依赖偏好的广义Nash对策的拟变分不等式的任意解成为均衡的适当条件.我们检查这些游戏的可解性时,球员的战略地图(可能)无界。作为应用,我们得到了不确定性条件下Arrow-Debreu经济竞争均衡的存在性。

英文摘要:

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the variational reformulation of generalized Nash games relies on the numerical representation of players' preferences into objective functions, which is only possible if preferences are transitive and complete. In this work, we first characterize the jointly convex generalized Nash equilibrium problems in terms of a variational inequality without requiring any numerical representation of preferences. Furthermore, we provide the suitable conditions under which any solution of a quasi-variational inequality becomes an equilibrium for the generalized Nash game with non-ordered (incomplete and non-transitive) non-convex inter-dependent preferences. We check the solvability of these games when the strategy maps of players are (possibly) unbounded. As an application, we derive the occurrence of competitive equilibrium for Arrow-Debreu economy under uncertainty.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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