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arXiv 2106.04860math.OC
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De Finetti的竞争控制问题

De Finetti's control problem with competition

Erik Ekström, Kristoffer Lindensjö

摘要:

我们研究竞争的影响,从一个共同的来源与扩散动力学的资源提取问题。在对称的版本中,具有相同的提取率,我们证明了存在的纳什均衡的策略是阈值类型,我们的特征的平衡阈值。此外,我们表明,竞争增加导致提取阈值较低,平衡值较小。对于不对称的版本,每个代理人有一个单独的提取率,我们提供了阈值策略的平衡的存在,我们表明,相应的阈值排序的提取率以相同的方式。

英文摘要:

We investigate the effects of competition in a problem of resource extraction from a common source with diffusive dynamics. In the symmetric version with identical extraction rates we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium where the strategies are of threshold type, and we characterize the equilibrium threshold. Moreover, we show that increased competition leads to lower extraction thresholds and smaller equilibrium values. For the asymmetric version, where each agent has an individual extraction rate, we provide the existence of an equilibrium in threshold strategies, and we show that the corresponding thresholds are ordered in the same way as the extraction rates.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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