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arXiv 2204.07016math.OC
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竞争未知的de Finetti问题

The de Finetti problem with unknown competition

Erik Ekström, Alessandro Milazzo, Marcus Olofsson

摘要:

我们考虑一个资源提取问题,它扩展了经典的de Finetti问题的维纳过程,包括的情况下,当一个竞争对手,谁配备了提取所有剩余的资源在一块的可能性,可能存在,我们解释这种未知的竞争代理受到可能的欺诈。这种情况被建模为一个具有不完全信息的制造者和停止者非零和随机对策。为了让欺诈者隐藏他的存在,我们考虑的策略,他的行动时间是随机的。在这些条件下,我们提供了一个纳什均衡,这是充分描述在相应的单人de Finetti问题。在这种均衡中,代理人和欺诈者使用奇异策略,以这样一种方式,二维过程,这代表了可用资源和过滤估计的积极竞争,反映在一个特定的方向沿给定的边界。

英文摘要:

We consider a resource extraction problem which extends the classical de Finetti problem for a Wiener process to include the case when a competitor, who is equipped with the possibility to extract all the remaining resources in one piece, may exist; we interpret this unknown competition as the agent being subject to possible fraud. This situation is modelled as a controller-and-stopper non-zero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information. In order to allow the fraudster to hide his existence, we consider strategies where his action time is randomised. Under these conditions, we provide a Nash equilibrium which is fully described in terms of the corresponding single-player de Finetti problem. In this equilibrium, the agent and the fraudster use singular strategies in such a way that a two-dimensional process, which represents available resources and the filtering estimate of active competition, reflects in a specific direction along a given boundary.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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